Study Guide

for the Examination for Accreditation in Public Relations + Military Communication

A preparation tool for candidates

http://www.praccreditation.org/apply/apr-m/

©2017 Universal Accreditation Board
Functioning as part of the Public Relations Society of America

www.praccreditation.org
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Resources</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Training</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tips and What to Expect</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs: An Operational Function</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs Functions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Audiences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Principles of Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Fundamentals of Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researching, Planning, Implementation and Evaluation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Options</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Warfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations and Campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs Assessment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs Guidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs Annex to an Operations Order (Annex F)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Communication Annex to an Operations Order (Annex Y)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Camera (COMCAM) Appendix 9 to an Operations Order (Annex C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics and Law</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Conventions of 1949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) / Rules of Engagement (ROE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Article 5 Operations — “Collective Defense”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Charter Article 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other International Agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution
Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act
U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948
Posse Comitatus Act
1913 Gillett Amendment
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act
FOIA Improvement Act of 2016

**Communication Models and Theories** .................................................................34
Cultural Implications

**Business Literacy** ..................................................................................................36
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process
Guiding Documents
Open Source Intelligence
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy
Joint Professional Military Education

**Management Skills and Issues** .............................................................................42
PA/PR Similarities and Differences
Joint Public Affairs Career Field
Related Career Fields
Overseas — Internal and External Information

**Crisis Communication Management** .................................................................50
What’s a Crisis?
Public Affairs Role
NATO Crisis-Response Operations
Domestic Response
Foreign Disaster Assistance

**Media Relations in Joint Operations** .................................................................54
Journalists and Geneva Conventions
Nine Principals of Combat Coverage
Media Pools
Embedded Media
Free Press in New Democracies
Media Assessment
U.S. Government-Funded Media
Media Operations Center
Embargoes
Media Engagement for Counterinsurgency

Using Information Technology Efficiently .................................................................63
Internet-Based Capabilities (a.k.a.: Web/Social Media)
Information Review
Accessibility
Endorsing Non-USG entities
Social Media in Crisis Communication
Internet-based Capabilities in the Tactical Environment
Alteration of DoD Imagery

History of and Current Issues in Public Affairs .......................................................69
Brief History of PA Career Field
Military PA Today
Additional Duties as Assigned
Expeditionary Public Affairs
Unified Command Plan

Advanced Communication Skills ..............................................................................77
Communication Synchronization — A Coordination Process
National Military Strategy
Threats to National Security
National Power
Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII)
National Response Framework
Interagency (and NGO) Coordination
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)
Counterinsurgency / Adversarial Media

Glossary of Terms .......................................................................................................86
Introduction

Welcome to the Accreditation in Public Relations + Military Communication program (APR+M). This study guide supplements the APR Study Guide – the guide you will, or did, use to complete the computer-based examination. You will use both the APR Study Guide and the APR+M Study Guide to prepare for the APR+M Panel Presentation. The military communication knowledge, skills and abilities required to obtain the APR+M designation are specific to this guide.

APR+M is an enhanced certification building on the well-established Accreditation in Public Relations (APR) program. The APR+M designation signifies someone who meets all qualifications of APR plus additional requirements for military public affairs professionals. Earning APR+M signifies a professional level of experience and competence within the public relations industry as a whole and an understanding of public affairs activities in joint military operations. The APR+M credential is designed to strengthen the military public affairs community, encourage ongoing professional development, and establish a standard of knowledge and professional consistency within military public affairs.

About the Panel Presentation

The APR+M Panel Presentation tests military communicators’ proficiency in military public affairs and 12 specific areas of public relations competencies the computer-based examination are unable to effectively judge. APR+M candidates will complete a questionnaire that highlights their military public affairs experiences prior to sitting down with the three-person panel.

The panel will use the questionnaire and KSA list to guide the discussion and determine if to award the designation. Military-specific KSA discussed in the APR+M Study Guide fall into the following categories:

1. Researching, Planning, Implementing and Evaluating Programs
2. Ethics and Law
3. Communication Models and Theories
4. Business Literacy
5. Management Skills & Issues
6. Crisis Communication Management
7. Media Relations
8. Using Information Technology Efficiently
9. History of and Current Issues in Public Relations
10. Advanced Communication Skills.

At least one member of the panel will hold an APR+M designation. In some cases, the panel may determine not to grant the +M designation for the candidate, instead suggesting he or she remain an APR – or continues to pursue only that designation – before sitting for a second APR+M Panel Presentation after further preparation.
About the Universal Accreditation Board (UAB)
The Universal Accreditation Board is the premier public relations credentialing organization. The UAB oversees Accreditation in Public Relations, a voluntary certification program for public relations professionals. The UAB comprises accredited senior-level professionals who represent nine professional public relations organizations, including the Department of Defense. Board members provide a balanced blend of backgrounds in public relations specialties and academia.

About the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA)
PRSA is the largest professional organization serving the U.S. public relations community. With a mission to “advance the profession and the professional,” PRSA provides news and information, thought leadership, continuing education and networking opportunities; sets standards of professional excellence and ethical conduct; and advocates for the business value of public relations and greater diversity among public relations professionals. Based in New York, PRSA comprises 112 local Chapters; 14 Professional Interest Sections that focus on specific industries and practice areas; and the Public Relations Student Society of America, which is active at more than 320 colleges and universities.

About the Accredited in Public Relations + Military Communication (APR+M) Council
The APR+M Council oversees operational details of the APR+M program for the UAB. The Council assists APR+M candidates in scheduling Panel Presentations and establishing mentorship programs.
Acknowledgements

Materials in this study guide have been compiled by the APR+M Council, a group of accredited military communication professionals dedicated to furthering development of the joint public affairs community.

Editors for the third edition:
Sean Robertson, APR+M, Commander, U.S. Navy
Jennifer Bocanegra, APR+M, Major, U.S. Army
Jim Brooks, APR+M Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy, retired
Deidre Foster, APR+M
Brandon Morris, APR+M
Heather Paynter, APR+M, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy Reserve
Ian Phillips, APR+M
Karen Platt, APR+M, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, retired
Kashia Simmons, APR+M

Continuing thanks go to APR+M Council members and others who helped the Universal Accreditation Board, U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) and the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) establish the APR+M program in 2010, and thanks to the Defense Media Activity for continuing to support the APR+M program.

This study guide is dedicated to the memory of military public affairs professionals who gave the ultimate sacrifice in support of their country, the free flow of information, a free press and a free society.
Information and Resources

In addition to the APR Study Guide, APR+M candidates should be familiar with the following key PA documents:


DoD Issuances are available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/

Joint Publications are available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

CJCS Directives are available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/

Allied Joint Publications are available online from the NATO Standardization Database: http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/nsdd/listpromulg.html

Additional Sources and References
The following are additional source documents and helpful references that APR+M candidates might find helpful:

DoD Issuances
1. DOD Directive 2311.01E, “DoD Law of War Program,” May 9, 2006, as amended
2. DODD 5105.74, “Defense Media Activity,” December 18, 2007
15. DODI 5410.20, “Public Affairs Relations with For-Profit Businesses and Business Industry Organizations,” September 29, 2016
16. DODI O-3600.02, “Information Operation (IO) Security Classification Guidance (U),” November 28, 2005. Note: This document is controlled; see DTIC website for access instructions.
17. DODI 8500.01, “Cybersecurity,” March 14, 2014
23. DOD 5500.7-R, “Joint Ethics Regulation (JER),” August 1, 1993

Joint Publications
33. JP 5-0, “Joint Planning,” June 16, 2017

NATO Publications
National Preparedness Resource Library
http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-resource-library


Public Law


Unified Action Handbook Series

Set of four handbooks developed to assist the joint force commander design, plan, and execute a whole-of-government approach. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc_pam.htm


U.S. Agency for International Development


U.S. Air Force Public Affairs Center of Excellence


49. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter No. 07-04, Media Is the Battlefield Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, October 2006

50. CALL Newsletter No. 09-11, Media Relations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, December 2008

Service Social Media References

Other
Online Training

The following are optional online training courses available to military communicators pursuing APR+M.

Doctrine Networked Education and Training System (DOCNET)
Self-paced, online training modules accessible via this CAC-required website: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses/courses.htm. Courses of interest:

- **Joint Task Force Headquarters**, August 2013. This course provides the military professional knowledge of key doctrinal concepts related to formation and employment of a joint task force headquarters to command and control joint operations.
- **Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations**, July 2013. This course introduces military professionals to joint doctrine for the coordination of military operations with U.S. Government agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
- **Joint Operations**, October 2012. This general overview covers application of operational art and design in planning joint operations. The course describes operational art and its various elements, as well as the role and function of operational design and phasing.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
FEMA offers several courses through its independent study program (ISP) available from: https://training.fema.gov/is/crslist.aspx

- **IS-800.B: National Response Framework, An Introduction**. This three-hour Web-based course introduces participants to concepts and principles of the National Response Framework.
- **IS-100.B: Introduction to the Incident Command System**. Introduces the Incident Command System (ICS) and provides the foundation for higher level ICS training. This course describes the history, features and principles, and organizational structure of the Incident Command System. It also explains the relationship between ICS and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).
- **IS-200.B: ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents**. Designed to enable personnel to operate efficiently during an incident or event within the Incident Command System (ICS).
- **IS-700.A: National Incident Management System (NIMS) An Introduction**. This course introduces and overviews the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS provides a consistent nationwide template to enable all government, private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations to work together during domestic incidents.
- **IS-775: EOC Management and Operations**. This course describes the role, design, and functions of Emergency Operations Centers and their relationships as components of a multi-agency coordination system.
IS-250.A: Emergency Support Function 15 (ESF15) External Affairs: A New Approach to Emergency Communication and Information Distribution. This one-hour course provides basic training on application of ESF 15 Standard Operating Procedures. The course is designed for all FEMA External Affairs staff members, regardless of duty station; personnel in all other FEMA divisions; and federal, tribal, state, local, private-sector, military and Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) partners.

**Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Courses**
CAC is required to access these self-paced training modules at: [http://jko.jten.mil/](http://jko.jten.mil/). Sample of courses relevant to APR+M:

- **JFC 100 Module 5**: Joint Operations Planning. Course No.: J3OP-US1145. An overview of joint operation planning including key steps of the joint operation planning process and deployment planning.
- **JFC 100 Module 8**: Interorganizational Coordination and Multinational Operations. Course No.: J3SN-US1148. Basic background information on multinational operations for a joint task force (JTF), fundamentals of joint operations, and challenges of executing JTF missions at the operational level.
- **Introduction to Rules of Engagement.** Course No.: J3SN-MN105. A self-paced, non-assessed introductory course on rules that limit the application of “deadly force.”
- **Information Operations (IO) Fundamentals.** Course No.: NNC-J6-DISA-0022-L. Principles of joint information operations (IO); IO planning, coordination, and assessment; and supporting organizations.
Candidates pursuing the APR+M designation will need to be familiar with contents of this study guide and the APR Study Guide. Take note of when material in one book complements the other and when information from both guides is essential for effective public affairs operations. For instance, the Crisis Communication section in the APR Study Guide presents information essential for all PR/PA professionals to understand in order to guide their bosses, clients or commanders in creating and following a crisis communication plan. The Crisis Communication section in the APR+M Study Guide contains additional information about military-specific domestic and overseas agencies involved in large-scale federal government response to crises.

Candidates for the APR and the APR+M will take the same computer-based examination; military-specific information is not included in the examination. APR+M candidates must be familiar with subject matter related to both civilian and military practices. APR+M candidates will complete a different Panel Presentation questionnaire from APR candidates. APR+M candidates can draw on information in this study guide as they prepare for their Panel Presentation. APR+M candidates should include only unclassified material in their Panel Presentation questionnaires and portfolios.

Candidates who have already earned APR, work in military communication, and want to add the +M need successfully complete only the APR+M Panel Presentation. They are not required to take the computer-based examination again.

Panel Presentation
The Panel Presentation is the only opportunity for an APR+M candidate’s knowledge, skills and abilities to be fully assessed to earn the +M designation. Therefore, APR +M candidates must be prepared to answer military-specific information pertaining to joint operations. The Panel will give the candidate the opportunity to present their portfolio but their primary objective is to ensure the candidate is prepared to sit for the computer-based examination and is well-versed in strategic military communication.

Candidates should ensure the portfolio they submit to the Panel contains enough details to show proficiency in the KSAs outlined in this study guide. Panel members use the portfolio as the baseline for determining to grant Accreditation. Strategic thinking, problem solving and the “why” behind tactics are all-important factors when completing the portfolio.
Public Affairs: an Operational Function

For your APR+M Panel Presentation, you should be familiar with topics in this section and be able to compare and contrast them with civilian public relations practices. A good working knowledge of how and why PA plays a part in military operations is key.

The public affairs professional is the joint force commander’s principal spokesperson and senior adviser on public affairs (PA). To gain such a trusted position, PA professionals must be able to provide information in near real time to the public, to the commander, and to the supporting forces using a variety of traditional, digital and social media channels. Keys to success require a number of things, primarily: (1) planning, training and equipping PA professionals, (2) integrating PA operations into all levels of command on a daily basis, and (3) ensuring strategic PA planning occurs early in military operations planning. Although journalists may have access to tactical units during hostilities, PA professionals must have access to information and senior-level staff officers continuously and must have the capabilities to advise them early and often on strategic communication principles.

Public Affairs Mission

The mission of Department of Defense (DoD) public affairs is to plan, coordinate and synchronize U.S. military public information activities and resources to support the commander's intent and concept of operations (CONOPS).

Public affairs personnel support the joint force commander (JFC) by advising him/her and the command team on all public affairs matters. The PAO communicates truthful and factual unclassified information about defense activities to U.S. and allied partners as well as national, international and internal audiences. PA professionals provide advice to the commander on media events and operations, approve outreach activities, and help develop and disseminate command information.

Public Affairs Functions

A skilled military public affairs practitioner will integrate communication planning into the operations functions as early as possible to ensure all aspects of the operation will be covered. His or her public affairs assessment should drive the support. The campaign plan should outline how and when specific tactics will fulfill goals and Public Affairs Guidance will provide the operation’s forces with the tools necessary to communicate that plan.

PA Functions. PA functions are part of a broader communication process focused on supporting the commander and achieving mission objectives. PA functions include providing counsel to the JFC and staff; providing PA training, research, planning, assessment, and evaluation; developing and disseminating communication products; communicating with publics; and integrating PA and VI into joint planning. Throughout the entire process, PA will:
(1) **Provide Advice and Counsel to the Commander.** PAOs advise the commander on communicating with the public, including objective counsel on the impact of proposed COAs and policy decisions on relevant populations. They use research and analysis to build a shared situational awareness with commanders and staff on emerging issues and public sentiment. They bring focus to the impact the joint force has on the OE and its publics, improve responsiveness to public interests, articulate potential unintended consequences of planned actions, and quickly identify perceived disparities between actions and words.

(2) **Lead Staff Communication Alignment.** As the primary coordinator of public information, PA is in a unique position to alert the JFC when actions, words, and images are not aligned and to recommend actions to bring them into alignment through the CCS process. The PA staff aligns communication with PAG from higher headquarters down the chain to subordinate commands, and throughout the staff and with key stakeholder commands to include US and multinational forces.

(3) **Lead PA and Public Communication Activities.** The PAO leads the PA staff and public communication efforts.

(4) **PA Training.** PA training prepares commanders and members throughout the command to effectively represent their units, Services, and DoD in interviews with the media, when hosting embedded media or civilian visitors, in casual conversation with non-DoD personnel, and in social media. The PA team must be able to conduct a wide range of training ranging from familiarization for an entire command in an auditorium to focused one-on-one coaching for command leadership and subject matter experts (SMEs). The PAO and PA team also train members of the joint force to increase their understanding of the PA mission, capabilities, role in joint planning process, and support to overall communication effort.

**Key Audiences**

a. **American Public.** Through active engagement, the military demonstrates it is accountable, transparent, a community partner and a responsible steward of national resources. Communication with the American public tells about U.S. military power; homeland defense; and military capabilities, preparations and results.

b. **International.** While the Department of Defense (DoD) has an obligation to keep the American public informed about its activities, the U.S. military should apply the same principles of information to international audiences. Current information technology, especially the widespread use of social networking sites, ensures that information in the public domain is available worldwide. Therefore, information provided to international publics is provided to domestic publics. Modern military operations are often conducted as part of a coalition force or to support U.S. public diplomacy. DoD should, within the constraints of operations security, keep host nations informed about military operations on their soil and with their armed forces. International media interest in military operations, especially overseas, may be just as high as U.S. media interest. Strategic public affairs planning will take into consideration the messaging to American and international audiences through a variety of communication platforms.
c. **Internal Groups.** Internal or command information programs are the primary means commanders use to establish two-way communication with internal stakeholders including military members and their families, DoD civilians, and government contractors. The goals are to create awareness of the organizational goals, inform members of significant developments and increase effectiveness of personnel as organizational ambassadors. PA professionals must have knowledge and skills to conduct internal information programs at home, while deployed in support of joint, domestic, or emergency operations.

d. **Adversaries.** Credible information regarding U.S. and allied intentions and conduct can undermine adversary propaganda, potentially cause dissent within adversary ranks and, therefore, reduce adversary effectiveness. The National Security Strategy places “renewed emphasis on deterrence” and strengthening “our regional deterrence postures.” The National Defense Strategic Guidance lists “deter and defeat aggression” as one of 10 primary missions of the armed forces. The guidance says “credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complimentary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor.” Effective deterrence requires effective communication aimed at those we wish to deter.

**DoD Principles of Information**

Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered quickly. In carrying out that DoD policy, the following Principles of Information shall apply:

1. **Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions.**

2. **A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the armed forces of the United States and their dependents.**

3. **Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.**

4. **Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the armed forces.**

5. **DoD’s obligation to provide the public with information on DoD major programs may require detailed PA planning and coordination in DoD and with other government agencies.**

**DoD Fundamentals of Information**

These five fundamentals complement the DoD Principles of Information and describe best practices to follow when fighting in the global information battlespace.

1. **Tell the Truth.** Military PA personnel will release only truthful information.

2. **Provide Timely Information.** Commanders should be prepared to release timely, coordinated and approved information about military operations.

3. **Practice Security at the Source.** All DoD personnel are responsible for safeguarding sensitive information. As sources of information, each DoD member should be aware of
operations security (OPSEC) issues, whether being interviewed by the media or sharing information with family or friends.

4. **Provide Consistent Information at All Levels.** Commanders should ensure that DoD PA operations put forth a consistent message through its many voices. Information should be appropriately coordinated and in compliance with official DoD and supported command guidance before it is released to the public.

5. **Tell the DoD Story.** Every military and civilian member of DoD should help provide accurate information about the armed forces and national defense operations to the public. Commanders should educate and encourage their military and civilian employees to tell the DoD story by providing them with timely information that is appropriate for public release.

**Irregular Warfare**

Irregular warfare is a contest for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. The populations carry particular weight as both the battleground and object of the conflict. Adversaries hide among the population and use it as a shield. These adversaries often play on legitimate aspirations and grievances against unpopular, abusive or corrupt governments to gain popular support and legitimacy, such as in an insurgency. Given the psychological and political dimensions of the contest, perceptions are as important as any physical battlefield reality.

The battle of the narrative, as this struggle for influence has been called, is waged through the people who have formal or informal power or standing to sway sentiment or induce compliance of the general population. An effective counter-narrative is based on real grievances that resonate with the relevant population. The joint force counters irregular threats in both steady-state and surge conditions by some combination of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations. Key activities include communication synchronization, information operations of all kinds, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement, intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

**Counterinsurgency**

Public opinion, perceptions, news reports, public information and rumors influence how the populace perceives host-nation legitimacy. PA is part of the information environment. PA provides truthful public information and facilitates news media access to preempt, neutralize or counter adversary disinformation efforts. Insurgents and counterinsurgents know that popular perception and support, both locally and globally, are important considerations for success.

In their planning, PA professionals support the commander’s counterinsurgency objectives. PA personnel communicate to foreign, domestic and internal audiences truthful, timely and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the operational area. The timely and accurate release of factual information helps counter propaganda, misinformation and disinformation. The PA assessment should focus on identifying, measuring and evaluating implications of the information environment that the commander does not control but can influence by integrating a comprehensive information strategy into the planning and decision-making process. The PA professional must provide the joint force commander an assessment of public support within the operational area and timely feedback on public opinion trends. That feedback should be based on media analysis, published polling data, and professional assessments. *(See also Media Engagement for Counterinsurgency, Page 61 of this guide.)*
Researching, Planning, Implementation and Evaluation

You must understand the four-step public relations process—research, planning, implementation and evaluation (RPIE)—to earn Accreditation. You will need to demonstrate mastery of this process during the APR+M Panel Presentation and on the computer-based examination. The Panel Presentation questionnaire will require you to apply the RPIE steps to PA operations. You will include in your Panel Presentation portfolio a PA plan that you developed (or participated in). That plan should follow the RPIE steps. You will discuss that plan as part of your Panel Presentation. Be prepared to evaluate and assess your own work, which includes being able to provide a critique of your portfolio based on your study of the RPIE process. Panel members may ask what you could have done better, or how you may have approached it differently. If the plan does not follow the RPIE steps—or skips any of them—you will need to explain what you would have done to fill those gaps.

The APR Study Guide discusses the RPIE process in detail, offers background on research methodologies, gives examples of plan formats, and includes planning exercises. This section covers additional topics that influence military PA operations.

KSA’s for this section include:

Military Options: Understand the range of military assistance, outreach, and other programs that can be used to develop positive relationships with other countries (such as noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian assistance, stability operations, reconstruction)

Campaign Planning: Understand the difference between campaign planning in a military operation and planning an information campaign.

Line of Operations: Demonstrate knowledge of the commander’s line of operations and how they interact and coordinate with one another in Service and/or Joint environment.

Joint Planning: Understand planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces.

Public Affairs Assessment: Understand how to evaluate the public affairs impact of pending decisions and recommendations about the structure of public affairs support for military and joint operations.

Public Affairs Guidance: Demonstrate knowledge of when and why public affairs guidance is needed and how to address the different sections, such as details governing the release of information to the public.

Annex F: Understand the elements of the Public Affairs planning annex to an operations order.

Annex Y: Demonstrate knowledge of the Strategic Communication annex to an operations order.

COCAM Appendix 9 to Annex C: Demonstrate knowledge of the procedures and planning for Combat Camera Appendix to Annex C to an operations order.
Military Options

A range of military responses can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence-building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries as well as truth projections; military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades and harassment operations; raids; intervention operations and armed conflict involving air, land, maritime and strategic warfare operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgency, counterinsurgency and civil war in foreign countries. U.S. military forces can:

- Promote stability
- Prevent or reduce conflicts and threats
- Provide a road map for peacetime deterrence
- Exert action across the range of military operations
- Deter aggression and coercion in a crisis
- Fight and win major wars
- Conduct multiple, concurrent, small-scale contingency operations
- Use flexible deterrent options

Levels of Warfare

The United States recognizes two basic forms of warfare: traditional and irregular. Traditional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and of nation-states. Traditional warfare typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces against each other in all physical domains as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). A less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force, which usually serves that nation’s established government.

War is fought on three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. No finite boundary separates these three levels. Nevertheless, these levels help commanders design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate forces. Activities at a strategic level establish national and multinational military objectives, sequence initiatives, define limits, and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power. A joint task force typically functions at an operational level. On the tactical level, troops on the ground carry out orders and plans.

Operations and Campaigns

An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Campaigns are joint activities. Functional components (air, land, maritime, and special operations) and service components plan and conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Campaign planning may
begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident but is normally not completed until after the president or secretary of defense selects the course of action during crisis-action planning. Joint operation planning within campaigns directs small-scale, short-duration strikes or raids, activities that don’t typically involve combat, such as nation assistance; and large-scale, long-duration combat operations.

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Inherent Resolve are examples of major campaigns. Joint operation plans for campaigns consider all instruments of national power and how their integrated and/or coordinated use can attain national strategic objectives.

Types of Campaigns

**Global Campaign.** A global campaign requires joint operations in multiple areas of responsibility. More than one combatant command could be involved. PA professionals and planners must be aware of competing requirements for potentially scarce strategic resources.

**Theater Campaign.** A theater campaign encompasses activities of a geographic combatant command. Operation Inherent Resolve is an example of an ongoing theater campaign.

**Subordinate Campaign.** A subordinate campaign plan describes actions of a subordinate joint force command. This command accomplishes strategic or operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign.

**Joint Planning**

Combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders use joint operation planning to develop joint military actions that respond to contingencies and crises. Joint operation planning provides a bridge between strategy and tactics and links national strategic aims to tactical combat and noncombat operations. Joint operation planning blends operational art with operational design and uses the joint planning process (JPP).

**Operational art** is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs and is supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience. Commanders skilled in operational art provide the vision that links tactical actions to strategic objectives.

**Operational design** supports operational art with a general methodology and operational design tools for understanding the situation and the problem. The goal is to conceive and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. Operational design tools, such as centers of gravity, lines of operation and lines of effort, help the joint force commander and staff visualize the operational approach. That approach broadly describes actions the joint force must take to reach the desired military end state.

Operational design and JPP are complementary elements of the overall planning process. Operational art and the application of operational design lay the conceptual foundation for structuring campaigns and operations. JPP provides an orderly analytical process through which the joint force commander and staff translate the broad operational approach into detailed plans and orders. JPP presents logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action; select the best course of action; and produce a plan or order.
The relationship between operational art, operational design and JPP continues throughout campaign execution. By applying the operational design methodology with the procedural rigor of JPP, the command remains open to questioning the mission’s continuing relevance and suitability while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans.

**Public Affairs Assessment**

When working in joint, combined or unilateral operations, military PA practitioners must produce a PA assessment. The assessment analyzes the news media and public environments to evaluate the degree of understanding about strategic and operational objectives and military activities and to determine levels of public support. The assessment includes judgments about the PA impact of pending decisions and recommends the structure of PA support for the assigned mission.

Assessment begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, or achieving results. Baselines for what is going to be measured are established at this point.

1. Long-term PA objectives should support OPLAN or campaign objectives. PA planners identify how PA, within its construct and mechanisms, can contribute toward achieving objectives. Assessment of objective progress should include the same MOE and measures of performance (MOP). Impact indicators should be established for each MOE and MOP. This is accomplished by being part of the joint planning process from the beginning and working with the assessment planners.

2. This initial set of criteria becomes the basis for future assessment.

Media analysis or assessment of tactical PA products and activities using various open sources, in combination with classified information collection sources, can provide updates to the information environment assessment. Various assessment methods, including content analysis,
coding, and other such methods can be used to provide updates to the commander and planners. During execution, assessments should contribute to adjustments to both current operations and future planning.

**Public Affairs Guidance**

Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) gives commanders and PA professionals left and right limits for discussing defense issues and operations with journalists and others. PAG is an internal working document not intended for public distribution. As information changes, so do messages and PAG. Continual updates ensure that units are prepared to handle issues if or when they resurface.

Approved PAG can be issued by the highest local authority and distributed to subordinate units for an event or issue expected to have broad interest and on which the PA professional expects queries. PAG elements can vary in style and content. PAG could include approved PA policy, contingency statements, answers to anticipated media questions, proposed responses to telephone inquiries from the public, and community relations guidance. PAG may explain the methods, timing, location, security concerns, sensitivities, and other details about release of information to the public.

PAG for military operations, issues or events that would attract national and international media attention due to their size, importance, or political sensitivities, or for operations/issues that require department-to-department level interagency coordination, is routed through the combatant commander (COCOM) to be vetted through the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OATSD(PA)) for approval.

DoD has a specific format for Proposed PAG (PPAG) that OATSD(PA) must approve. PPAG may or may not be a classified document. The proposed guidance should say what is unclassified or otherwise releasable about an event and note any security, accuracy, propriety, or policy considerations. Here are steps DoD follows for PPAG:

**Step 1.** The *action agency initiates* the PPAG.

**Step 2.** DoD receives the PPAG and staffs. DoD can do three things with the PPAG:

- Disapprove
- Amend (with major changes)
- Approve (with minor amendments)

**Step 3.** Upon final approval, the guidance is sent out as PAG.

(See also “Development, Submission, and Approval of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG),” DODI 5405.3, February 18, 2016)

Who could use your PAG?

1. Staff members
2. Subordinate commands
3. PA office staff
4. Higher HQ — as notification
5. Troops
Public Affairs Annex to an Operations Order (Annex F)

Based on the operational plan, PA personnel must determine PA and/or communications objectives, develop PA employment concepts, establish command relationships, and provide necessary resources. These require a communication strategy to coordinate PA efforts. Annex F puts PA terms and concepts into an operations-order format that commanders and staff sections throughout the joint command can readily understand.

Annex F should address all PA-related transportation, communications, billeting, equipment, and personnel resources required to support the plan. However, the details of those PA requirements needed to support an operation should be coordinated and included in other appropriate annexes (Logistics, Personnel, and Communications) to obtain these resources and conduct PA operations as outlined in annex F.

Strategic Communication Annex to an Operations Order (Annex Y)

Doctrine in Joint Publication 5-0 requires that concept and operation plans include an Annex Y (Strategic Communication). That annex proposes a synchronized effort for “interagency coordination and implementation.” Synchronized planning of PA, Information Operations (IO), and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy is essential for effective strategic communication. Annexes A through D, and Annexes K and Y are required annexes for a crisis action plan (CAP) operational order (OPORD). All others may either be required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or deemed necessary by the supported commander.

Combat Camera (COMCAM) Appendix 9 to an Operations Order (Annex C)

Visual information (VI) planning in an operations order can be found in Appendix 9 to Annex C. VI planners conduct operational planning to identify, coordinate and communicate visual information requirements and resources for combatant commanders. VI is a deployable force multiplier of which COMCAM is a specialized subset. Requests for COMCAM and VI professionals can be based on tactical, operational, and strategic requirements. Requests should be coordinated to leverage the VI assets assigned. Non-COMCAM assets are considered when they are deployable and could be trained to operate in a combatant command.
Ethics and Law

For your APR+M Panel Presentation, you should be familiar with topics in this section and be able to compare and contrast them with civilian ethical and legal standards. You don’t need to memorize these regulations and laws, but you should have a good working knowledge of them and how they influence military PA practice. Specific KSAs examined in the Panel Presentation include:

**Article 19, United Nations Charter:** Demonstrate knowledge of international laws, treaties, status of forces agreements, host nation agreements and charters that can impact public affairs operations.

**Law of Armed Conflict:** Understand how relevant international law plays a role in military operations and how Public Affairs planning is impacted. Also Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force.

**1913 Gillett Amendment:** Understand the impact of this amendment and other acts and laws that govern military public affairs operations – such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Goldwater Nichols, Smith-Mundt, etc.

---

**Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)**

LOAC reflect a desire among civilized nations to prevent unnecessary suffering and destruction while not impeding the effective waging of war. LOAC regulates the conduct of armed hostilities and protects civilians, prisoners of war, wounded individuals, the sick, and the shipwrecked.

DODD 2311.01E, “DoD Law of War Program,” helps ensure compliance with LOAC. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that treaty obligations of the United States are the “supreme law of the land.” The U.S. Supreme Court has held that international law is part of U.S. law. Consequently, treaties and international agreements the United States makes enjoy equal status with laws passed by Congress and signed by the president. Therefore, all people subject to U.S. law must observe U.S. LOAC obligations. Those who violate LOAC may be held liable for war crimes.

Three important LOAC principles govern armed conflict: military necessity, distinction and proportionality.

1. **Military Necessity.** Military necessity requires combat forces to engage in only those acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. Military necessity applies to weapons. Illegal arms for combat include poison weapons and expanding hollow-point bullets. Even lawful weapons may require some restrictions in particular circumstances.

2. **Distinction.** Distinction means discriminating between lawful combat targets and noncombat targets, such as civilians, civilian property, prisoners of war, and wounded personnel who are out of combat. Forces should engage only valid military targets. Distinction requires defenders to separate military objects from civilian objects to the maximum extent feasible. Therefore, locating a hospital or POW camp next to an ammunition factory would be inappropriate.
3. **Proportionality.** Proportionality prohibits using more force than necessary to accomplish the military objective. This principle encourages combat forces to minimize collateral damage — the incidental, unintended destruction that occurs because of a lawful attack against a legitimate military target.

**Geneva Conventions of 1949**

Geneva Conventions consist of four separate international treaties. They govern the treatment of wounded and sick forces, POWs, and civilians during war or armed conflict.

**Combatants.** The Geneva Conventions distinguish between lawful combatants, noncombatants and unlawful combatants. (*See also Geneva Conventions regarding journalists, Page 53 of this guide.*)

- **Lawful Combatants.** Someone authorized by governmental authority or the LOAC to engage in hostilities is a lawful combatant. He/she must be commanded by a person responsible for subordinates; wear fixed distinctive emblems recognizable at a distance, such as uniforms; carry arms openly; and conduct combat operations according to the LOAC. The LOAC provides combatant legal immunity for lawful warlike acts—except violations of LOAC—during conflict.

- **Noncombatants.** These individuals are not authorized by governmental authority or the LOAC to engage in hostilities. In fact, they do not engage in hostilities. This category includes civilians accompanying the armed forces; combatants who are out of combat, such as POWs and the wounded; and certain military personnel who are members of the armed forces not authorized to engage in combatant activities, such as medical personnel and chaplains. Noncombatants may not be made the object of direct attack. They may, however, suffer injury or death as a result of a direct attack on a military objective if the attack is on a lawful target by lawful means.

- **Unlawful Combatants.** Unlawful combatants are individuals who directly participate in hostilities without authorization by governmental authority or international law. For example, bandits who rob and plunder and civilians who attack a downed airman are unlawful combatants. Unlawful combatants who engage in hostilities violate LOAC and become lawful targets. They may be killed or wounded and, if captured, may be tried as war criminals for their LOAC violations.

- **Undetermined Status.** Should doubt exist about an individual’s status, that person should be extended protections of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention until status is determined.

**Other Issues**

- **Military Targets.** Military targets are sites, activities or people who make an effective contribution to an enemy’s military capability. The total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization of these targets would enhance legitimate military objectives.

- **Targeting Personnel.** Military attacks against cities, towns or villages not justified by military necessity are forbidden. Attacking noncombatants for the sole purpose of terrorizing them is prohibited.

- **Targeting Objects.** Objects normally dedicated to peaceful purposes enjoy a general immunity from direct attack. These objects include medical units; transports of wounded and sick
personnel; safety zones established under the Geneva Conventions; and religious, cultural and charitable buildings, monuments, and POW camps.

**Enemy Military Aircraft and Aircrew.** Enemy military aircraft may be attacked and destroyed wherever they are found—except in neutral airspace. An attack on enemy military aircraft must be discontinued if the aircraft is disabled and has lost its means of combat.

**Enemy Civilian Aircraft.** An enemy’s public and private nonmilitary aircraft are generally not subject to attack because the LOAC protects noncombatants from direct attack. However, if the civil aircraft initiates an attack, it may be considered an immediate military threat and attacked.

**Enemy Military Medical Aircraft.** Enemy military medical aircraft is generally not subject to attack under the LOAC. However, it may be subject to attack in some circumstances.

**Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) / Rules of Engagement (ROE)**

ROE delineate the circumstances and limitations under which naval, ground and air forces will initiate and/or continue combat with other forces. The president, secretary of defense and operational commanders use ROE to regulate armed force in the context of national policy goals, mission requirements and the LOAC. ROE must strike a balance between preventing force that would be inconsistent with national policy (and would therefore hinder mission accomplishment) and the need of commanders and other military personnel to protect themselves and accomplish assigned missions. During military operations, LOAC and specifically tailored ROE provide guidance on the use of force.

**NATO Article 5 Operations — “Collective Defense”**

The concept of “Collective Defense” binds North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and is enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The concept provides that if a NATO ally is the victim of an armed attack, every other member of the alliance will consider the act of violence an armed attack against all members and will take actions necessary to assist the ally attacked. NATO invoked Article 5 of the treaty for the first time after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

**United Nations Charter Article 19**

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. The declaration has been translated into at least 375 languages and dialects: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. The declaration arose directly from the experience of World War II and represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are entitled. The declaration consists of 30 articles. They have been elaborated in subsequent international treaties, regional human-rights instruments, national constitutions and laws. Article 19 relates specifically to freedom of expression:

**Article 19:** Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Other International Agreements

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is an accord between a country and a foreign nation stationing military forces in that country. The U.S. military has the largest international presence and has the most SOFAs. The United Kingdom, France, Australia, Germany, Italy, Russia, South Korea and many other nations station troops abroad as well and negotiate SOFAs with their host countries. While most U.S. SOFAs are public, some remain classified.

Visiting Forces Act. The status of military personnel visiting areas under the jurisdiction of another country and/or forces of one country attached to or serving with forces of another country are covered under visiting-forces laws. These acts may apply to some foreign nonmilitary people associated with visiting military forces (e.g., dependents, civilian employees, etc.) as well. Such acts commonly address such issues as criminal jurisdiction, treatment of foreign military personnel found to be absent without leave or military deserters, double-jeopardy situations, etc.

Treaty. Sovereign states and international organizations may make agreements under international law. A treaty may be known as an international agreement, protocol, covenant, convention, exchange of letters, etc. Treaties can be loosely compared to contracts: both are means for willing parties to establish obligations. A party that fails to live up to its obligations can be held liable under international law. The central principle of treaty law is expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda — “pacts must be respected.”

Protocol. Generally a protocol is an international agreement that supplements a previous treaty. A protocol can amend the previous treaty or add additional provisions. Parties to the earlier agreement are not required to adopt the protocol. Where many parties to the first agreement do not support the change, it may be called an “optional protocol.”

Memorandum of understanding (MOU). An agreement between parties may sometimes be explained in a memorandum of understanding. A MOU does not imply a legal commitment and is not legally enforceable. An MOU is formal alternative to a gentlemen’s agreement.

First Amendment, U.S. Constitution

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

While the First Amendment does not explicitly set restrictions on freedom of speech, other declarations of rights sometimes do so. The European Convention on Human Rights, for example, permits restrictions “in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

Military Expression. The First Amendment does apply to service members. The protection of a citizen’s right to free speech does not, however, apply with equal scope or force to a member of the armed forces. Some statements ordinarily protected in the civilian context are forbidden in the military. Speech by a service member that interferes with accomplishment of a military
mission or decreases responsiveness to command poses a concrete and direct threat to U.S. national security. Under the “clear and present danger” test, speech does not actually have to hinder national defense to be unprotected; speech need only threaten such harm. The military can prohibit speech that is prejudicial to good order and discipline or service so long as that speech creates a clear and present danger.

**Prior Restraint.** A U.S. legal term related to censorship, “prior restraint” refers to government actions to prevent communications from reaching the public. “Prior restraint” keeps materials from being published. Censorship that requires a person to seek governmental permission before publishing anything constitutes prior restraint every time permission is denied. Sometimes, the government becomes aware of a forthcoming publication on a particular subject and seeks to prevent it. In other cases, the government attempts to halt ongoing publication.

**Wartime Censorship.** During World War I, and to a greater extent during World War II, war correspondents accompanied military forces. News reports from these correspondents were censored to preserve military secrets. This censorship was not generally challenged, and no major court case arose from this wartime practice. In later conflicts the degree of wartime censorship varied. In some cases reporters and editors alleged that the censorship was done as much for political as military purposes. These claims were particularly common during the Vietnam War and the invasion of Grenada. Such issues arose again during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when many embedded reporters accompanied soldiers into the country. Reports were censored to prevent them from revealing a unit’s exact location.

**Pentagon Papers Case.** The relationship between prior restraint and national security was tested in 1971. The government attempted to prevent *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* from publishing the Pentagon Papers, a classified study of U.S. decision-making in Vietnam. The U.S. Supreme Court protected the newspapers’ rights to publish, even though most justices believed that publication would adversely affect the nation’s interests. These adverse effects, they concluded, were insufficient to justify prior restraint. The decision was fragmented. Each justice filed a separate opinion in the case.

**Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act**

The Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act requires the State Department to include scrutiny of news media restrictions and intimidation as part of its annual review of human rights in foreign countries. The department must determine if foreign governments participate in or condone violations of press freedom. The act, passed in 2010, is named for Daniel Pearl, a veteran *Wall Street Journal* correspondent. He was reporting on terrorist groups in Pakistan when he was kidnapped and beheaded in early 2002.

**U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948**

Popularly called the *Smith-Mundt Act*, the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 402) specifies how the U.S. government can engage in public diplomacy. Since 1972, the act has prohibited domestic access to information intended for foreign audiences. The act is the foundation for U.S. overseas information and cultural programs at the State Department. Information produced by Voice of America (VOA) for audiences outside the United States shall not be disseminated within the United States. On request, programming shall be available after release abroad for examination in English at VOA by representatives of U.S. press
associations, newspapers, magazines, radio stations, research students, scholars and members of Congress. The act exempts VOA from releasing program transcripts in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. The Smith-Mundt Act prohibits the executive branch from distributing propaganda at home. Due to this restriction, U.S. taxpayers also do not know how VOA (and its successors) operates or what it broadcasts. (See also U.S. Government-Funded Media, Page 59 of this guide.)

**Posse Comitatus Act**

The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits giving U.S. military personnel search, seizure or arrest powers. The act was amended in 1981 to permit increased DoD support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. Joint PA professionals should understand that this act limits military authority in domestic operations. The act applies when DoD active-duty military personnel in a Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) status are tasked or requested to assist civilian authorities. Active-duty service members, reservists, federalized National Guardsmen and in some instances DoD civilians cannot provide “direct” support to law-enforcement authorities. DoD personnel may provide expert advice, information, basic training, equipment, maintenance of equipment, and operation of equipment and facilities. In emergency situations, as determined by the attorney general and the secretary of defense and where civilian law enforcement personnel are not capable of enforcing the law, DoD personnel may be able to search, seize, arrest and conduct any other activity “incidental” to protecting people and property from conduct that violates this act. The law prohibits certain transactions involving nuclear materials (possession, use, disposition, transfer, intimidation, and threats) or weapons of mass destruction.

National Guardsmen under state control or in “Title 32 status” during emergency-response operations may perform law-enforcement duties.

**1913 Gillett Amendment**

Reaffirmed in Public Law 92-351 Section 608(a), enacted July 13, 1972, this amendment prohibits government spending on publicity or propaganda to support or defeat legislation pending before Congress. This law does not prohibit DoD open houses, congressional visits, and tours.

The 1913 amendment came in response to actions by President Theodore Roosevelt. He attempted to win public support for his programs through a network of publicity experts and publications designed to influence members of Congress. The House of Representatives added the Gillett Amendment to the 1913 Department of Agriculture appropriation bill. The amendment stipulated that federal agencies could not spend money for publicity unless specifically authorized by Congress. Several years later, Congress passed the gag law, which prohibited using appropriations for services, messages or propaganda. Nevertheless, succeeding presidents continued to employ a public relations strategy to communicate to their publics.

In 1972 Congress reaffirmed its disapproval of using federal dollars for publicity by enacting Public Law 92-351, Section 608(a). It prohibits government spending on “publicity for propaganda purposes designed to support or defeat legislation pending before the Congress.” Because of these laws, government agencies use terms such as “public information.”
“communications,” “constituent relations,” “legislative liaison,” and “public affairs” to describe building and maintaining relationships with their constituents.

1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act

Movement toward greater centralization within DoD gained momentum after a series of military misfortunes and strategic surprises during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The first was the failure of the 1980 mission to rescue 53 Americans held hostage by the revolutionary regime in Tehran. A member of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff wrote:

“The military had six months to organize, plan and train. … Nonetheless, only six of the eight helicopters arrived at the rendezvous point, known as “Desert One,” in the middle of Iran; one of the six that got that far suffered mechanical problems and could not proceed. That did not leave enough helicopter capacity to carry out the mission, and it was aborted. As the rescue force was departing, a helicopter collided with one of the C-130s [cargo aircraft] that were to carry commandos and helicopter fuel; eight servicemen died. The helicopter, with valuable secret documents, weapons and communications gear on board, was hastily abandoned. ... How could this … have possibly arisen? It happened because the services were so separate and so determined to remain separate.”

The move toward centralization gained momentum from a second military operation: Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 raid on the Caribbean island of Grenada. Though American medical students held hostage by the Marxist government of Grenada were rescued successfully, the hastily planned raid revealed how difficult communicating and working together were for units of different services.

In response, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. It forced DoD to be more responsive to the commander-in-chief and more efficient in conducting interservice matters. Objectives of Goldwater-Nichols for the military included:

- Establishing clear responsibility.
- Assigning commensurate authority.
- Enhancing joint strategy formulation.
- Providing for better contingency planning.
- Strengthening the effectiveness of service members through Joint Professional Military Education and Joint Duty Assignments.

The success of Operation Desert Storm seemed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the new and centralized command relationships. Joint operations have given birth to a whole new body of doctrine and requirements for every aspect of U.S. military affairs. No recent military operation proved this evolution better than the invasion of Iraq: The three-week blitzkrieg of Baghdad was an example of joint-service synchronization. Iraq, since the fall of Baghdad, has been a highly irregular and largely land war. Air power has played an important supporting role, and the broader regional war has required a good deal of maritime patrol and other forms of sea power. Nevertheless, as the U.S. mission has centered on counterinsurgency operations, the major burden is borne by the Army.

Public Law 104-231 (E-FOIA) says any person can file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. According to DODI 5400.07, it is DoD policy to:

- Promote public trust by making available the maximum amount of information, in both hard copy and electronic formats, on the operation and activities of DoD consistent with the DoD responsibility to protect national security and other sensitive DoD information.
- Allow a requester to obtain DoD records that are available through other public information services without invoking the FOIA.
- Make available, according to the procedures established by Reference (c), DoD records requested by a member of the public who explicitly or implicitly cites the FOIA.
- Answer promptly all other requests for DoD information and records under established procedures and practices.
- Release DoD records to the public unless those records are exempt from disclosure as outlined in Section 552 of Title 5, United States Code.
- Process requests by individuals for access to records about themselves contained in a Privacy Act system of records according to the procedures set forth in DODD 5400.11, as amplified by DODI 5400.07, “DoD Freedom of Information Act Program,” January 2, 2008.
- Provide FOIA requesters with citizen-centered ways to learn about the FOIA process, about DoD records that are publicly available and about the status of a FOIA request and appropriate information about the DoD response.

Nine Exemptions — The Freedom of Information Act entitles government agencies to withhold information or records based on nine specific exemptions. The nine FOIA exemptions are:

1. Records currently and properly classified in the interest of national security;
2. Records related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the DoD or any of the DoD Components;
3. Records protected by another law that specifically exempts the information from public release;
4. Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a private source which would cause substantial competitive harm to the source if disclosed;
5. Internal records that are deliberative in nature and are part of the decision making process that contain opinions and recommendations;
6. Records which if released, would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
7. Investigatory records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes
8. Records for the use of any agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; and
9. Records containing geological and geophysical information (including maps) concerning wells.

Records requested by journalists through public information channels should be released if that information would not be withheld under the FOIA. Similarly, requests from other members of the public for information that would not be withheld under the FOIA should continue to be honored through appropriate means without requiring the requester to invoke the FOIA.
FOIA Improvement Act of 2016

On June 30, 2016 President Obama signed into law the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 (Public Law No. 114-185). The act addressed a range of procedural issues. A few of the key points that affect the DoD are:

- Requires that agencies establish "procedures for identifying records of general interest or use to the public that are appropriate for public disclosure, and for posting such records in a publicly accessible electronic format."
- Requires agencies to make available for inspection in an electronic format records that have been requested three or more times (frequently requested records).
- Prohibits an agency from charging a fee for providing records if the agency misses a deadline for complying with an FOIA request unless unusual circumstances apply and more than 5,000 pages are necessary to respond to the request.
- Prohibit an agency from withholding information requested under FOIA unless the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by a FOIA exemption or disclosure is prohibited by law (presumption of openness).
- Requires agencies to “consider whether partial disclosure of information is possible whenever the agency determines that a full disclosure of a requested record is not possible.”
- Requires agencies to “take reasonable steps necessary to segregate and release nonexempt information.”
- Exemption 5 of the FOIA is amended to provide that “the deliberative process privilege shall not apply to records created 25 years or more before the date on which the records were requested.”
Communication Models and Theories

Specific questions about communication theories, communication models and public relations history account for 8 percent of the Examination. Other questions throughout the test, however, assume an understanding of these subjects. In addition to the specific KSAs identified in the APR Study Guide, the following applies during the Panel Presentation:

Understand and be able to apply communications models and theories in a joint military operational environment.

Cultural Implications: Demonstrate an understanding of intercultural communication theory and how misunderstanding culture(s) in which the military is operating can impact public perception and views of US government interests.

Theories and Models

Many people confuse communication and public relations believing the terms are synonymous when in fact they are not. Communication is the reciprocal process of exchanging signals to inform, persuade, or instruct based on shared meanings and conditioned by the communicator’s relationship and the social context. Understanding the various contexts for communication is important because public relations communicators compete in a crowded message environment.

Refer to the APR Study Guide chapter on “Understanding Communication Theories, Models and the History of the profession.”

Cultural Implications

It is common for the U.S. to support exercises and operations overseas. There are several considerations PAOs should consider when working in an overseas environment.

Language

Language can present significant communication challenges to command and PA personnel. PA plays a significant role not just in working with foreign press to get the organization’s information out, but also informing the internal audience what to expect as they move into an area where English is not the standard language.

Religion

It is critical to have an understanding of how religion influences the local customs or the political system.
**Political systems**

A working knowledge of how the political system within the country works is also necessary. PAOs and commanders will have official contacts with a variety of local, regional and national-level governmental leaders and citizens. Therefore, you must understand how populations are politically structured.

**Culture**

Without understanding that diverse groups/ cultures interpret messages differently, Americans overseas may find themselves misunderstood or may misunderstand their host country citizens.

Additional areas of consideration are social values, economics, geography, history, and laws. Cultural sensitivities can influence dialogue, dress and interactions during an exercise or mission.

All of these factors may and probably differ from what we are accustomed to. Public affairs should help prepare service members to avoid such pitfalls. While stationed or deployed overseas, the PAO has several agencies and commands that are an effective source of guidance for public affairs planning considerations specific to the host nation (JP 3-61, pp III-13 – III-16).
Business Literacy

*The APR Study Guide* says public relations practitioners need to understand how economic trends affect organizations. Business-literate practitioners base strategic decisions on sound analysis and relevant financial information. They understand how those factors could influence business success and promote effective public affairs practices while maintaining responsible oversight of government funding. DoD uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process to determine operational priorities and allocate resources. Therefore, PA personnel need to understand how DoD does business through PPBE. Candidates will need to demonstrate familiarity with the PPBE process during the APR+M Panel Presentation. In addition, candidates should be familiar with other documents that guide the way DoD operates.

Specific KSAs include:

**Resource, Planning, Program, Budget Execution (PPBE) Process:** Understand the stages of DoD financial planning and how it’s important to Public Affairs.

**Open Source Intelligence:** Demonstrate knowledge of open source information publicly available, its potential intelligence value and impact on military operations, and how public affairs operations contribute to open sources at home and abroad.

**Defense Support of Civil Authorities:** Demonstrate knowledge of the civil support mission within the I.S. for natural or man-made disaster, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence management, and support as required.

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy:** Knowledge of activities and measures taken by the DoD components to support and facilitate U.S. government public diplomacy efforts.

**Joint Professional Military Education:** Relate career field-specific requirements and expectation of JPME and the history behind development of joint education institutions.

---

**Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process (PPBE)**


The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process is one leg of a triad that makes up the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and serves as the primary mechanism for the Secretary of Defense to request, allocate, track, and expend funds within the Department of Defense (DoD).

The other two components of the DAS are the Acquisition process, which manages the development and procurement of DoD systems, and the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS), which is responsible for the requirements process.

PPBE comprises five different fiscal year budget cycles at any given point in time (see Figure 1), and is further complicated by numerous federal, department, and agency-specific timelines, missions, and priorities.
On an annual basis, the military services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) and defense agencies submit to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) that plans a five-year funding period. The Deputy SECDEF (DEPSECDEF) manages the PPBE on a day-to-day basis and provides overall leadership and oversight. The annual PPBE process provides the overall planning direction, develops the DoD POM, and creates a Budget Estimate Submission (BES) for years one and two of the POM.

Planning

The first phase of the PPBE is planning, which involves reviewing all current policy documents and objectives to ensure the resulting Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) aligns with the President’s and the SECDEF’s policy goals. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) leads the planning phase. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) also plays a significant role in accordance with his 10 U.S.C. §151 responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the SECDEF. The CJCS’s role is to advise the SECDEF, be the joint warfighter advocate, and prioritize requirements within warfare capability areas. Documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy provide input into the planning phase to try to ensure that threats, long-term strategy, larger force structure/readiness concerns and cost effectiveness are addressed in the planning phase.

Programming

The Director of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office (CAPE) leads the second phase - the programming phase, which begins with creation of the POM. The POM describes the proposed budget for forces, manpower, and funding. It also describes associated risks where needs are not funded.

Once each military service submits to CAPE its requests in the POM, CAPE forecasts the resource requirements of each of the military services for the coming five years, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). This phase analyzes for the SECDEF and the President the anticipated effects of the POM on forces, manpower, and funding in future years based on present-day decisions.
**Budgeting**

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer leads the budgeting phase in which the military services complete their budget estimates for the first year of the five-year POM. Under guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Comptroller reviews the budget submissions to ensure appropriate funding and fiscal controls, phasing of the effort over the funding period, and whether it can be realistically executed in the requested budget year. This phase includes a back-and-forth dialogue between the Comptroller and the military services to help inform the Comptroller’s decision-making as he or she constructs the unified defense budget. Resource Management Decisions (RMDs), signed by the SECDEF, document program and budget decisions. The services update their budgets to comply with RMDs.

The final product is submitted to OMB each December for inclusion in the President’s annual budget request to Congress, which is usually released in February. The RMD is the DoD’s input to the Presidential Budget Request (PBR).

**Execution**

The military services (and defense agencies) manage the execution phase that spends funds. They also conduct ongoing reviews, to determine two things:

1. Whether the appropriated funds are being obligated and expended in accordance with the approved budget; and

2. Whether the funds are achieving the desired effect.

During each fiscal year (FY), a mid-year review is conducted throughout the DoD and programs are adjusted as required. This review is intended to identify programs in which funds are not being spent as forecast. Funds identified as not meeting either criteria listed above can be reprogrammed from their original purpose to pay for unforeseen program or pricing changes in other programs.

While not formally considered a phase of PPBE, evaluation happens during each part of the PPBE and occurs throughout the FY. Pursuant to the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23), CAPE is responsible for the evaluation of plans, programs and budgets, as well as program execution.

Annually, DoD carries out the four phases of the PPBE process simultaneously. DoD therefore requests, allocates, tracks and spends funds through a given calendar year and across multiple fiscal years. This process repeats annually, building upon prior years, as each execution phase will impact the following fiscal year’s planning phase.

**Other Key Players**

While each phase has a designated lead player, that person (and his or her staff) works in concert with many others during all phases of the PPBE process. Examples of key players who are not PPBE phase leads include:

- USD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) advises on all matters related to acquisition, technology, logistics, installations, equipment, and environmental functions, including providing cost and schedule needs for approved programs to execute
successfully and deliver intended capabilities within the Defense Acquisition System process.

- USD Personnel and Readiness (P&R) advises on all matters related to total force (active and reserve military, civilian, and contract support) including planning, requirements, readiness, workforce mix and balance, applicable personnel policies, and healthcare issues.
- USD for Intelligence (I) advises on all matters related to intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. The USD(I) is also a key player in the Intelligence budget process.
- DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) advises on major cyber investments, information technology (IT) resource allocations, and investment decisions, including recommending whether to continue, modify, or terminate IT investments.

Guiding Documents

National Security Strategy
The National Security Strategy is prepared periodically for Congress by the executive branch. This document outlines the major national security concerns and how the administration plans to deal with them. The Goldwater-Nichols Act spells out the legal foundation for the security strategy. The document is purposely general (in contrast with the National Military Strategy) and its implementation relies on elaborating guidance in supporting documents.

National Military Strategy
The National Military Strategy (NMS) Report describes the strategic environment, opportunities and challenges that affect national interests and national security. The report lists the most significant regional threats to U.S. national interests and security as well as the international threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and asymmetric challenges.

The NMS accounts for contribution of allies and other partners. Military capabilities are employed as part of an integrated national approach that uses all instruments of national power — military, information, diplomatic, legal, intelligence, finance and economic. The NMS includes an assessment of the nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated with successfully executing the missions called for under the strategy.

Defense Strategic Review
The DSR is created every four years and is a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, posture, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program. The DSR is conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DSR replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 2014.
Open Source Intelligence (“Source of First Resort”)

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is a form of information collection that involves finding, selecting and acquiring information from publicly available sources and analyzing it to produce actionable intelligence. “Open” refers to publicly available sources (as opposed to covert or classified sources). Open-source intelligence can affect PA operations, and vice versa. Mass media; Web-based communities, such as social networking sites; and public data all are used for PA, communication strategy and intelligence collection. Three different views are often heard regarding the value of open-source information.

1. Policymakers derive less value from open-source information than from clandestinely collected secrets. While open-source information can complement, supplement and provide context for classified data, such information rarely provides insight into an adversary’s plans and intentions.

2. Open-source information should be viewed not only as an important contextual supplement to classified data but also as a potential source of valuable intelligence. Proponents of this view cite the as-Sahab Institute, al-Qaida’s sophisticated Internet-based messaging and propaganda multimedia production facility, as an example of why open-source collection and analysis is important in today’s technology-driven and globalized world. Others cite al-Qaida’s ability to use virtual space to recruit, proselytize, plot and plan with impunity.

3. The “middle-ground” position argues that open-source information probably will never provide the “smoking gun” about some issue or threat. But the material can help analysts and planners better focus or “drive” collection activities by identifying what is truly secret. Open sources, therefore, should be viewed as an analyst’s “source of first resort.”

U.S. military offices that engage in open-source monitoring activities include:

- Defense Intelligence Agency
- National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
- U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office
- U.S. Army Asian Studies Detachment
- EUCOM JAC Molesworth
- Open Source Branch, Joint Intelligence Center, U.S. Special Operations Command
- Foreign Media Monitoring in Support of Information Operations, U.S. Strategic Command

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is support provided by federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD component assets, and National Guard (NG) forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status or when federalized) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.

During DSCA operations, military PA activities, military civil authority information support elements (CAISEs) activities, public information actions, and news media access to the DSCA operational area are subject to approval by the primary agency. The primary agency may
establish a JIC to coordinate PA, CAISE, and public information actions. The DoD forces should coordinate PA activities and comply with PA guidance from the joint field office.

(See also JP 3-28, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities”)

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy**

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) includes DoD activities and measures to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG. This can include activities to understand and engage key foreign publics in order to inform them of US policies while influencing behavior that advances US interests and shapes the operational environment. Efforts that support building partnerships like medical and dental civic action programs are examples of DSPD activities which support both broader USG diplomacy efforts and communication-related objectives. Key leader engagement, military information support team (MIST) support of embassy efforts, and other theater engagement activities may also serve as examples of DSPD.

A Navy ship stopping in a foreign port — and interactions of U.S. sailors with local citizens — can affect how the host population perceives Americans and U.S. policy. In some areas, DoD and State Department roles and responsibilities overlap. For instance, some DoD informational activities and key-leader engagements closely resemble State Department public-diplomacy efforts. At times, this overlap is useful and does not lead to problems; at other times, one agency should have a lead or exclusive role.

**Joint Professional Military Education**

Achieving success across the joint learning continuum relies on close coordination of training and education. Professional Military Education (PME) complements training, experience and self-improvement to produce strategic-minded and critical-thinking individuals. JPME supports educational requirements for joint officer management.

**The PME Continuum**

An officer’s career goes through five significant phases. The enlisted career continuum has three phases. These phases reflect the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war as outlined in joint doctrine, especially Capstone and Keystone Joint Doctrine. PME and JPME curricula educate across all levels of war.

**Officer**

1. Pre-commissioning. Military education received at institutions and through programs producing commissioned officers upon graduation.
2. Primary. Education typically received at grades O-1 through O-3.
3. Intermediate. Education typically received at grade O-4.
4. Senior. Education typically received at grades O-5 or O-6.
5. General/Flag Officer (GO/FO). Education received as a GO/FO.

**Enlisted**

1. Basic EJPME. E-1 through E-6
2. Career EJPME. E-7 through E-9
3. Senior EJPME. E-7 through E-9 (Personnel Serving in Joint Assignments)
   - Senior Enlisted JPME Course. (Online through Joint Forces Staff College)
   - KEYSTONE Program (10-day course for E-9 senior enlisted)
Management Skills & Issues

There are no questions on the computer-based exam, however this topic will be addressed at the Panel Presentation. Specific KSAs for these topics are:

Communication Integration: Demonstrate knowledge of how to achieve coordination and alignment between intra- and inter- organizational communicators, to include messages and integration/involvement of communicators throughout all major lines of operation.

Information Operations: Demonstrate knowledge of IO doctrine (such as Joint Pub 3-13), IO principles and the relationship between IO and Public Affairs.

PA/PR Similarities and Differences

Similarities

Public affairs and public relations share many similarities (note: list not all-inclusive).
Both:
1. Conduct planned and sustained programs.
2. Counsel management on policies, procedures, and actions that are mutually beneficial to the organization and its publics.
3. Deal with relationships between organizations and their publics.
4. Generate publicity.
5. Engage in community relations.
6. Adjust policies, procedures, and actions found to be in conflict with public interest and organizational survival.
7. Monitor opinions and behaviors inside and outside the organization.
8. Produce specific changes in awareness, opinions, and behaviors inside and outside the organization.

Differences

Differences are based on the military’s mission and accountability to taxpayers. Profit-motivated industries and nonprofit organizations have different priorities (note: list not all-inclusive).
1. The military can have direct and powerful effects on large numbers of people.
2. Armed forces are accountable to many authorities and ultimately the American people.
3. The military operates in a “fish bowl” environment.
4. Public Law 92-351, Section 608(a), (which in 1972 reaffirmed the 1913 Gillett Amendment):
   a. Stipulates that federal agencies cannot spend money for publicity unless specifically authorized by Congress.
   b. Prohibits government spending on “publicity or propaganda designed to support or defeat legislation pending before the Congress.”
Joint Public Affairs Career Field
The DoD PA community consists of active-duty and reserve officers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and consultants. These PA professionals manage the flow of news and information from the military to the public. Although each military service has unique career-field requirements, most PA professionals begin their careers at the Defense Information School (DINFOS) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Students come from active and reserve elements of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force as well as international military forces. Courses include:

- Public Affairs Qualification Course (PAQC)
- Intermediate Public Affairs Specialist Course (IPASC)
- Joint Contingency Public Affairs Course (JCPAC)
- Joint Intermediate Public Affairs Course (JIPAC)
- Joint Senior Enlisted Public Affairs Course (JSEPAC)
- Joint Senior Public Affairs Course (JSPAC)
- Basic Public Affairs Specialist Course (BPASC)
- Content Managers Course (CMC)
- Basic Television Equipment Maintenance (BTVEM)
- Intermediate Photojournalism Course (IPC)
- Basic Combat Correspondent (BCC)

The advanced-level Broadcast Radio and Television Systems Maintenance (BRTSM) Course teaches students the ins and outs of American Forces Network engineering standards and practices. The Society of Broadcast Engineers accredits both basic and advanced maintenance courses. Students who complete either course with a GPA of at least 85 percent are certified as broadcast technologists.

Army Public Affairs is led by the Chief of Public Affairs. He or she heads the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs. The chief is responsible for all communication issues involving the Army as well as professional development of military and civilian PA personnel. The chief is charged with formulating PA strategies, plans and policies. The chief is senior adviser on communication matters relating to the Army to the Secretary of the Army; Chief of Staff, Army, and other senior DoD leaders. Assisting the chief are the PA directors for the National Guard and Army Reserve. Enlisted PA specialists are military occupational specialty (MOS) 46S, Public Affairs Mass Communication Specialist. Officers serve in the 46A PA functional area.

Marine Corps Public Affairs is led by the director of public affairs within the Division of Public Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps. Marines PA personnel fill five MOSs:

Enlisted
- 4300 Basic Combat Correspondent — Lance corporal to private.
- 4313 Broadcast Journalist — Master gunnery sergeant to private.
- 4341 Combat Correspondent — Master gunnery sergeant to private.

Officer
- 4302 Public Affairs Officer
- 4330 Historical Officer
Navy Public Affairs is led by the Chief of Naval Information within the U.S. Navy Office of Information. Enlisted members of the Navy PA community are rated as mass communication specialist (MC). Officers are Restricted Line Officers and hold the Special Duty Officer (Public Affairs) designator 165X. The Navy Public Affairs Support Element [NPASE] in Norfolk, Va., and San Diego, Calif., are field activities of the Navy Office of Information, Washington, D.C. NPASE teams made up of PA officers and enlisted MC specialists support the fleet and component commanders with scalable and immediate deployable force packages trained and equipped to handle current and emerging PA requirements. Media services include still photographic coverage, print journalism, motion media services, and visual, graphic design and multimedia services.

The Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs (SAF/PA) is responsible for providing guidance, direction and oversight for all matters pertaining to the formulation, review and execution of public affairs plans, policies, programs and budgets. The Air Force Public Affairs Agency (AFPAA), SAF/PA’s field operating agency, manages the Air Force’s video production, public web, and branding and trademark licensing programs. AFPAA also oversees Air Force Combat Camera (COMCAM) and two of three Air Force Tier 1 video production units and provides public affairs/visual information capabilities in support of worldwide contingencies and operations. The agency also supports development of photojournalist and broadcast journalist career development courses, evaluates emerging technologies for integration into future public affairs operations, and procures and tests equipment for the career field.

The Air Force PA Center of Excellence (PACE) at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, provides education and training on effective communication synchronization and associated tactics, techniques and procedures. The center is responsible for coordinating the instruction of communication topics across professional military and continuing-education courses and training programs. In addition, the center serves as the office of primary responsibility for communication-synchronization research and analysis. The center staff serves as advisers and advocates in the development of strategic communication-synchronization doctrine.

Coast Guard’s Director of Governmental and Public Affairs is responsible for ensuring the Coast Guard provides accurate, timely and strategic information to Coast Guard members and to the American public, Congress, other governmental agencies, and the private sector. The Coast Guard has about 77 PA professionals.

Defense Media Activity (DMA). In the 2005, the Secretary of Defense recommended the creation of a new DoD Media Activity that consolidated Armed Forces media programs with similar missions into a new organization.

The Secretary’s recommendation also included the co-location of American Forces Information Services (AFIS) with the new DoD Media Activity and the existing Defense Information School at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. This consolidation was DMA, which opened its doors in April 2011.

DMA provides a broad range of high quality multimedia products and services to inform, educate, and entertain Department of Defense audiences around the world. As listed in DoD Directive 5105.74, DMA’s five mission areas are:
• Provide a wide variety of information products to the entire DoD family (Active, Guard, and Reserve Military Service members, dependents, retirees, DoD civilians, and contract employees) and external audiences through all available media including: motion and still imagery, print, radio, television, Web and related emerging Internet, mobile, and other communication technologies.

• Communicate messages and themes from senior DoD leaders (Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Service Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders), as well as other leaders in the chain of command, in order to support and improve quality of life and morale, promote situational awareness, provide timely and immediate force protection information, and sustain readiness.

• Provide U.S. radio and television news, information, and entertainment programming to Active, Guard, and Reserve Military Service members, DoD civilians and contract employees, and their families overseas, on board Navy and Coast Guard ships, and other authorized users.

• Provide, throughout the Department of Defense and to the American public, high quality visual information products, including Combat Camera imagery depicting U.S. military activities and operations.

• Provide joint education and training for military and civilian personnel in the public affairs, broadcasting, and visual information career fields to meet DoD-wide entry level skills and long-term career development requirements.

DVI is responsible for overseeing joint VI services provided by the Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (DIMOC) and the Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS). DVI is the military proponent for VI, policymaking and oversight of VI programs. DVI helps ensure DIMOC and DVIDS provide timely product transport, distribution, coordination and preservation of high quality DoD imagery. DVI establishes policy and procedures to ensure imagery is made easily and quickly available to support a multitude of DoD and joint missions while ensuring the American people have a visual record of what the U.S. military does in support of our national interests.

The Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (DIMOC) as part of the Defense Visual Information (DVI) component of the Defense Media Activity, executes the operational management of visual information for Department of Defense components in support of U.S. military activities and operations.

The dimoc.mil website was activated as a portal for efficient video and still archiving, accessibility, and ingest capability in conjunction with the Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) (http://www.dma.mil/Services/DVIDS). Users now have a central place from which to search imagery, send imagery, access VI resources and contact customer service.

DIMOC operates facilities in three locations:

• The Joint Combat Camera Center (JCCC), located at Fort Meade, Maryland, coordinates the ingest of current still and motion imagery produced by DoD visual information
professionals around the world. The JCCC also works with the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands to resolve transmission problems, coordinate operational guidance, and provide support to deployed Combat Camera teams.

- The visual information (VI) Records Center, located in Riverside, California, provides DoD enterprise-level records management and maintains the DoD’s physical and digital imagery archives. The Records Center also provides records distribution and the archival preservation of physical DoD-owned media, and is the funnel for DoD visual records to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
- The VI Services Center, located at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania, coordinates DoD and public visual information customer fulfillment, and is the primary point of contact for DoD, Federal agencies, NATO partners and the American public for acquiring Defense Imagery products, programs and services. The Services Center also provides timely customer service relating to DVIDS, the Defense Information Server and dimoc.mil.

DVIDS is a state-of-the-art, 24/7 operation that provides a timely, accurate and reliable connection between news organizations around the world and the military serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. DVIDS provides VI services for transport, processing and targeted distribution of various kinds of media content. Through a network of portable Ku-band satellite transmitters located in-theater and a distribution hub in Atlanta, DVIDS makes available real-time broadcast-quality video, still images and print products. DVIDS facilitates immediate interview opportunities with service members, commanders and subject matter experts. DVIDS supports a contracted maintenance and oversight capability for more than 200 portable satellite uplink terminals used to send imagery to the DVIDS hub for processing and delivery.

Related Career Fields

Civil Affairs (CA) supports the commander’s relationship with civil authorities and the civilian population. Civil Affairs’ role during stability and support operations is deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities and promoting peace. These operations come from United Nations mandates and are aimed at promoting peace and stability in an area or region. During wartime, CA becomes part of civil-military operations (CMO). CA supports CMO through:

- **Foreign Nation Support** — Identification, negotiation, and procurement of available resources within a foreign nation to support U.S. military missions.
- **Populace and Resource Control** — Activities to deny the enemy resources and accessibility to the people.
- **Humanitarian Assistance** — Programs to reduce effects of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions.
- **Military Civic Action** — Using indigenous military forces on short-term projects designed to enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy and image of a foreign government or military. These projects include public works, public health efforts, and mine-awareness campaigns.
- **Civil Defense** — Measures to minimize effects of enemy actions on civilians. Activities include restoring essential services and facilities.
• **Support to Civil Administration** — Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to friendly or neutral foreign governments or government agencies.

**Information Operations** (IO) is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. PA and IO have distinctly different missions that run on parallel tracks. Through various working groups and boards, PA and IO often interact and coordinate closely. However, federal law requires that PA and IO remain separate.

**IO Offensive Activities**
- Attacking adversary legitimacy and credibility
- Building and sustaining local civil support
- Shifting the loyalty of adversary forces
- Promoting the cessation of hostilities
- Undermining adversary confidence
- Persuading isolated forces to surrender

**IO Defensive Activities**
- Countering propaganda and disinformation
- Discouraging adversary offensive operations
- Supporting coalition building
- Assisting host nation information dissemination
- Facilitating control of populace and refugees
- Reducing civil support for the adversary
- Assisting in information dissemination

**Visual information** (VI) includes still photographs, digital still images, motion pictures, analog and digital video recordings, and hand- or computer-generated graphic art and animations that depict real or imaginary person(s), place(s), and/or thing(s). Besides images, VI includes related captions, overlays and intellectual control data. VI planners identify, coordinate and communicate VI requirements/resources for geographic combatant commanders. VI planners ensure adequate imagery capabilities are requested to fulfill the high-priority imagery requirements for the joint warfighter.

**Combat Camera** (COMCAM) is the acquisition and use of still and motion imagery in support of various classified and unclassified military operations. These operations include combat, information, humanitarian, special, intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, and PA. COMCAM is a limited, specialized and sought-after capability allocated through the Global Force Management Allocation Process. Each military service has dedicated COMCAM units. They receive specialized training (advanced field and weapons training as well as aerial and underwater qualifications) to integrate with any combat unit in austere and hostile environments.

**Public diplomacy** promotes U.S. national interest in a foreign country by understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences. All PA programs affecting the host nation must be coordinated with the U.S. embassy. If embassy and military guidance conflict the senior defense official would need to resolve the issue. The embassy’s country plan describes the coordination
requirements for routine and emergency information activities within the country. In a host
country, an embassy’s public diplomacy staff:

- Explains and advocates U.S. policies in terms credible and meaningful in foreign
cultures.
- Provides information about the United States, its people, values, and institutions.
- Builds lasting relationships and mutual understanding through the exchange of people
and ideas.
- Advises U.S. officials on foreign attitudes and their implications for U.S. policies.

Embassies will have contacts with host nation and stateside media outlets. Embassies can be a
resource to help credential foreign press. Embassies maintain speakers’ bureaus and information
resource centers. These centers allow government officials, journalist and educators to retrieve
information electronically. The State Department disseminates information in a host country
through:

- Contacts with host nation leaders.
- Electronic and printed media (e.g., Voice of America).
- Foreign press centers (New York City, Los Angeles, Washington).
- Field posts in 140 nations. These posts employ 200 State Department PA professionals.

Overseas — Internal and External Information

Internal Information

Internal information (also known as command information) programs are important overseas.
Service members have fewer sources of American-oriented information. American Forces
Network (AFN) and Stars and Stripes newspapers serve large portions of the unified command’s
area. At the military community level, local commanders need to supplement AFN and Stars and
Stripes with installation newspapers, local news on AFN stations, face-to-face communications,
and newcomer orientation programs.

Local citizens are part of internal audiences overseas. In countries such as Germany and Japan,
the people who live near our installations often become part of our television and radio audience
even though they may have no connection with the U.S. military. Local citizens can receive
AFN television and radio signals. We call these local foreign viewers and listeners a shadow audience.
You must consider them as part of your audience when planning internal information programs.

The greatest challenge for PA officers overseas will be dealing with negative incidents. Having a
good emergency-response plan and working closely with the embassy to handle these incidents
as tactfully as possible will mitigate negative effects on foreign perceptions of the military.

Four sources of PA guidance overseas

- The Unified Command disseminates guidelines on broad policy matters and some
community-relations issues.
- The Service Command provides service-unique policies, plans and materials. Service
commands supply most of your PA guidance.
- Combined Commands offer guidance for combined operations with host country or
other allied nations’ PA staffs. You’ll most often deal with combined commands during
exercises. Even though these activities are “just” exercises, coordination problems and
communication barriers can make them quite a challenge. Because journalists and politicians may be interested in the exercise, prepare for them.

- **Country Team** provides ambassadorial controls on program implementation and information release.

**External Information Overseas**

External information, whether it involves news releases or community-outreach programs, can be effective only if we consider host-nation perspectives. The embassy can be of great help to us because it has staff PA professionals in the host country.

Foreign press outlets are often advocacy-oriented. They slant news to their political or other interests. Local English-language newspapers may carry different news from the local-language newspapers. Having a language-qualified service member or the U.S. Information Services representative summarize local news coverage can help keep you aware of what local citizens are reading. Because each country is different, few rules about community relations overseas (known as civic affairs) are hard and fast. You may have to realign community relations to fit overseas functions. Whatever the country, remember: 1) Local citizens are interested in what we do; and 2) We must coordinate our programs with the embassy.

Those participating in multinational operations play key roles in foreign relations. These DoD representatives must build relationships that promote effective multinational cooperation. The DoD has developed “Four Tenets” of multinational cooperation to guide the U.S. armed forces:

- **Respect:** This tenet includes respect for each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history, and values.
- **Rapport:** Build a personal direct relationship. Commanders must establish the environment and set the example for developing rapport among subordinate commanders, staffs, and individual members of U.S. commands.
- **Patience:** U.S. commanders at all levels must lead by setting the example of untiring and even-handed patience. Commanders should focus on eliciting the best possible performance from the integration of U.S. and multinational partners’ forces.
- **Knowledge of Partners:** U.S. commanders must devote the time and resources to know and understand their comrades-in-arms. This effort is as important to success as the effort to understand the adversary.

Understanding your boss’ role in multinational efforts will enable you to help him/her conduct effective PA abroad. Cultivating an appreciation for host-nation customs, traditions and laws will continue to pay dividends in our daily and long-term relations with local citizens. Service members far from home will depend almost exclusively on our efforts to keep them informed and connected with news and events stateside.

*(See also Open Source Intelligence, Page 40.)*
Crisis Communication Management

The APR Study Guide covers crisis-communication planning, defines types of crises and offers tips on dealing with emergencies. This section augments that discussion with specific DoD crisis guidance.

KSA’s for this section include:

**Crisis Action Planning:** Demonstrate knowledge of Phases 1, 2, and 3 of crisis action planning and when it is used.

**Lead Federal Agency:** Understand the difference agencies in change and involved, in addition to the military, during crises and contingencies.

**Disaster Assistance Response Team:** Understand the role of other U.S. government agencies and missions in contingency operations.

“Crisis and emergency-risk communication is the attempt to provide information that allows an individual, stakeholders or an entire community to make the best possible decisions during a crisis emergency about their well-being, communicate those decisions within nearly impossible time constraints, and ultimately, to accept the imperfect nature of choices as the situation evolves.” — Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

**What’s a Crisis?**

JP 5-0, “Joint Operation Planning,” defines a crisis (within the context of joint operations) as “an incident or situation that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political or military importance that the President or the Secretary of Defense considers a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources to achieve national objectives” (Page II-28). Crises have three characteristics:

- Sudden: Little or no warning.
- Quick moving: Fast-breaking developments require rapid decisions.
- Escalating: One crisis may spawn another crisis someplace else.

**Public Affairs Role**

In crisis, public affairs acts as the strategic and tactical advisor to the commander for communication with internal and external publics.

The Principles of Information constitute the underlying public affairs philosophy for Defense.gov and the Department of Defense.

It is Department of Defense policy to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens
shall be answered quickly. In carrying out that DoD policy, the following principles of information shall apply:

- Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions. The Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both letter and spirit.
- A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.
- Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.
- Information shall be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security, threaten the safety or privacy of U.S. Government personnel or their families, violate the privacy of the citizens of the United States, or be contrary to law.
- The Department of Defense's obligation to provide the public with information on DoD major programs may require detailed Public Affairs (PA) planning and coordination in the Department of Defense and with the other Government Agencies. Such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in DoD public affairs programs.

**NATO Crisis-Response Operations**

A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian and can be caused by political or armed conflict, technological incidents or natural disasters. Non-Article 5 Operations (crisis-response operations) under the NATO treaty support the peace process in a conflict area and are called peace-support operations. They include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, conflict-prevention operations, peacemaking, peace building, and humanitarian operations.

**Domestic Response**

Under the Stafford Act, a state governor must formally ask the President for federal assistance. The Stafford Act is the “Magna Carta” of America’s emergency management community. The law governs how the U.S. government responds to all disasters. Planning and execution of DoD PA activities in domestic operations (within the United States and its territories and possessions) follows National Response Framework (NRF) incident communications emergency policy and procedures (ICEPP). This framework provides detailed guidance to all federal incident communicators. It establishes mechanisms for delivering coordinated messages, provides prompt federal acknowledgement of an incident and ensures communication of emergency information to the public. The ICEPP contains two annexes:

1. **PA Support Annex** — This annex describes interagency policies and procedures for incident communications with the public.
(2) Emergency Support Function (ESF) #15 — ESF #15 integrates PA, congressional affairs, intergovernmental (state, territorial, local, and tribal) affairs, community relations and the private sector under the coordinating auspices of external affairs.

The Department for Homeland Security is the lead federal agency for ESF #15. DoD typically acts as a supporting agency to a primary or coordinating agency. All PA and combat camera VI personnel ordered to deploy in support of domestic operations should have working knowledge of the NRF as it pertains to PA. Online Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) training courses are available at [http://www.training.fema.gov](http://www.training.fema.gov).

DoD PA releases its own information and imagery and conducts media operations, but products should be coordinated with either the primary agency or the Joint Information Center (JIC) to ensure consistent messages and avoid the release of conflicting or incident-sensitive information.

**Foreign Disaster Assistance**

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) involves DoD activities outside the United States to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger or poverty. FHA is normally done in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or State Department. U.S. military assistance supplements efforts of host-nation civil authorities with primary responsibility for providing that assistance.

FHA operations generate substantial media interest. The joint force commander, PA officer and staff must be prepared for that interest. Distribution of information via mass media is critical to creating public awareness of U.S., allied, coalition, and partner nations’ policies and objectives. Journalists should have as much access as possible throughout the operation. PA should make information fully and readily available and should withhold information only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of military personnel. Establishing a joint information bureau at the outset of operations serves as a logistics and information base for the press and facilitates news coverage.

The PA staff performs the following functions during FHA operations:

- Advises the combatant commander and staff on the public implications of potential and actual FHA activities.
- Identifies force structure, equipment and logistics requirements for PA support to specific operations.
- Evaluates the need for additional DoD PA support and facilitates requests for that support.
- Establishes liaison with PA counterparts in other agencies (i.e., country team, host nation, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations) in the operational area.
- Participates in operational planning.
- Plans and synchronizes U.S. military public information strategies and resources to communicate timely, factual, unclassified information about FHA operations.
- Provides media support and operates the media operations center.
- Analyzes and assesses public communication efforts.
Disaster Assistance Response Team

USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Response and Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance may deploy a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to assess and initially assist with management of the U.S. response. The DART is structured according to the size, complexity, type and location of the disaster as well as the needs of the affected country. The DART is a highly flexible, mobile organization capable of adapting to changing disaster requirements.

The press officer manages DART media activities. The press officer reports directly to the team leader. The DART should not operate or communicate in a vacuum. The press officer must ensure close coordination with other agencies throughout the disaster response. (Source: USAID Field Operations Guide)
Media Relations in Joint Operations

The APR Study Guide discusses media relations for civilian organizations. DoD PA personnel face similar situations and can learn from this discussion. But military PA personnel face unique media relations situations—especially in contingency operations. Specific laws, directives and regulations govern how military PA representatives interact with journalists and bloggers.

This section deals with emerging issues in international media environments that PA personnel may face in contingency operations. These issues include establishing a free press in new democracies, working with multiple domestic and international agencies, guiding a joint force commander on local media ethics (or lack thereof), joint information bureaus, other U.S. government-funded media organizations overseas, principles of combat coverage, and protection for journalists under the Geneva Conventions.

Specific KSAs:

**Free Press:** Demonstrate knowledge of how free press issues and DoD policy (such as Principles of Information) impact joint, combined, and interagency public affairs operations overseas.

**Media Assessment:** Demonstrate knowledge of media assessment and how to measure its impact. Understand the significance of media assessment overseas and reconstruction and stabilization operations.

**Media Operations Center:** Demonstrate knowledge of purpose, scope and elements of a MOC or Joint Information Center (JIC).

DoD remains committed to providing information to journalists and other significant publics through its principles of information, media pools, embed programs and a strong, well-trained PA force. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court summed up the ongoing friction between journalists and the military in Pell vs. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974):

“*It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources. ... It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information. ... That proposition finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court.*”

**Journalists and Geneva Conventions**

Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War states: “Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents and supply contractors, shall be treated as prisoners of war.” The term “war correspondent” was found somewhat restrictive, however, and additional provisions for journalists were added to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 under Protocol I, (Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts).

**Article 79 of Protocol I** addresses “measures or protection for journalists.” The article says, “[J]ournalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be
considered civilians [and] shall be protected as such ... provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians.” (Embedded journalists could, therefore, be imprisoned if captured, while journalists not accompanying armed forces should be accorded the same rights as civilians.)

### NINE PRINCIPLES OF COMBAT COVERAGE

DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of Military Operations

1. Open, independent reporting shall be the principal means of covering U.S. military operations.

2. Media pools (limited number of journalists who represent a larger number of news organizations for newsgathering and sharing material during a specified activity) are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. However, pools sometimes may provide the only means of early access to a military operation. In that case, media pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity (in 24 to 36 hours, when possible). The arrival of early-access media pools shall not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be applicable for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone shall be credentialed by the U.S. military and shall be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. armed forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules may result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone. News organizations shall make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

5. Journalists shall be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

6. Military PA officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with reporting.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit, when possible, journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft. The military shall be responsible for the transportation of media pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military shall supply PA officers facilities that enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material. The military shall make those facilities available, when possible, for filing independent coverage. If government facilities are unavailable, journalists, as always, shall file by any other means available. The military shall not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. Those principles in Paragraph 8 shall apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.
Media Pools

Media pools allow the journalists to cover a story when space limitations or conditions on the ground warrant such drastic measures. Media pools are used as a last resort. PA professionals anywhere at any level may be called upon to implement, manage, monitor or escort a media pool; therefore, all PA personnel must know what is expected of them and how to do the work effectively.

Function. Pools bring a representative group of journalists along with the first elements of any major U.S. military operation. These pools should last no longer than the very first stages of a deployment (24 to 36 hours) and should be disbanded rapidly in favor of independent coverage. Pools function as a unit, and coverage responsibilities are usually divided among pool members. For example, in a military operation the newspaper reporter may cover the shelling. Television may cover the helicopter assault. The wire-service reporter may cover the beach landing and so on.

Participation Criteria. Because of the many potential participants in the National Media Pool, certain criteria have been established to provide fair opportunities for all media organizations. The media organizations and their individual representatives to the National Media Pool are expected to understand and agree to certain rules. They include a quarterly rotation, active involvement in military coverage and commitment to maintaining operational security.

Transportation. The PA staff (whether in a JIB or MOC) is expected to see that journalists can get around the theater. Successful transportation of media pools is part of the planning process. The supported combatant commander provides authorized journalists military travel into and within the area of operation (1) when such travel is in connection with assignments to cover the operation, (2) when commercial transportation is restricted or unavailable, or (3) when the travel is to cover an airlift story. Correspondents travel only on orders issued or authorized by the supported or supporting combatant commanders. Air transportation is provided on a space-available, no-cost-to-the-government basis authorized by the supported or supporting commanders.

Embedded Media

Embedding was utilized on a large scale during Operation Iraqi Freedom. This operation, however, was not the first to embed journalists. All services decided they could collectively support 920 embeds during Iraq operations. After the embed program was announced, 775 journalists signed up. Those who signed up needed basic survival training, so a number of boot camps for journalists sprang up. Six-hundred-sixty reporters were matched up with units, and when combat began March 19, 2003, 550 journalists were in position. Nearly 700 unilateral journalists were at the Central Command Coalition Media Center at Qatar. As the embed program began to mature, some unforeseen issues surfaced. Reporters found ways around the next-of-kin notification process and there were issues with imagery being released without vetting by a public affairs officer. Once embeds saw no benefit to being embedded (in terms of access to key leadership, access to the battlefield, etc.) they would leave.

It should also be noted, however, that there are reporters who spoke highly of the embed process as well and felt they were given access to troops and commanders on the ground that helped to shape their understanding of U.S. military operations. Overall the Operation Iraqi Freedom embed program was viewed as a success and generated significant positive news coverage.
Embed Challenges

1. Reporters had to secure their own visas, country clearances, etc.
2. Embedded reporters had to sign extensive ground rules; unilateral reporters did not.
3. Reporters outnumbered PA practitioners, but PA practitioners still had to keep track of them, see if their needs were being met and determine that the on-scene commander was not unnecessarily endangering his/her men and women because of the embed.
4. A lot of video products and personnel were moved via military conveyance. Coalition air commanders usually required reporters to be escorted by a PA practitioner anytime they moved in theater.

Lessons Learned

1. Overall the Operation Iraqi Freedom embed program was viewed as a success. The effort generated much positive news coverage.
2. The embed program was a major part of the overall IO campaign.
3. The key to success was access.
4. Reporters were myopic and “covered the war through a soda straw ‘aperture.’” A lot of senior military leaders said coverage showed only the negative aspect of the war.
5. We now have a generation of journalists and commanders “who get it.”
6. The embedded reporter’s tenure with a unit was largely driven by money.
7. No reporters on the battlefield = lost stories.
8. Embeds are unreliable for the long haul because they always have another story to cover.
9. Sometimes reporters lack single-story endurance; no follow-up.
10. Embedding may not work everywhere because of host-nation sensitivities.

Free Press in New Democracies

Establishing an independent media system is not a primary military responsibility, but the need is very real and merits consideration by the joint force commander. Regardless of who has the lead in establishing a media system, military support may include supplying personnel with a good working knowledge of the news industry as well as technical and engineering support for rebuilding the media infrastructure.

Personnel from the joint force who may be involved in rebuilding or establishing news outlets include PA, information operations and civil affairs. After a contingency operation or conflict, the initial assessment concerning re-establishing governance should understand the structure and dynamics of the specific media environment and other sources of information available to the population.

Credible and accurate information can be rare in conflict or post-conflict environments. The public may perceive U.S. information (such as the DoD-launched Iraqi Media Network) as propaganda. The area may have little or no tradition of independent, nonpartisan news media. Journalists may be biased in their reporting or intimidated into self-censorship (or they may be untrained, undisciplined and easily manipulated). People who seek independent information may face persecution. (Source: Unified Handbook Series; see Page 10 of study guide for more information.)
Media Assessment

The JFC can rely on organic public affairs, information operations, and intelligence personnel to assess the information environment and media capability specific to the HN and the region. From the basis of this understanding, the JFC can then assess the potential for spoilers as well as the joint force to inform and influence information consumers or support the public information activities of the DOS, USAID, UN, or other international organizations. (See also “Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media,” Unified Action Handbook Series Book Two, February 19, 2016.)

Media Assessment Principles

Six principles can assist the media assessment process when considered with other material and realities on the ground:

1. **Define the media broadly.** Include information and communications technology: traditional media (radio, TV, print, online), social media (text messaging, social networking sites) and telecommunications.

2. **Clarity of role.** Determine in advance the commander’s role in helping provide the telecommunications infrastructure required for media development.

3. **Assess infrastructure and institutions.** Infrastructure assessments of the media landscape should be supplemented by assessments performed in collaboration with civilian media experts.
4. **Make speed a priority.** Ensure the host nation understands the U.S. government’s willingness to support the rapid development of the media sector with funds and resources.

5. **Distinguish information engagement from media development.** Conflating information engagement and media development diminishes the efficacy of both. *Information engagement* involves activities by the joint force and other U.S. agencies to disseminate timely, accurate information through the most credible and effective means available. The goal is to inform various audiences about reconstruction and stabilization activities. Media development involves activities to build a media sector (e.g., radio, TV, print, online, telecom) that contributes to the body politic and pluralistic society.

6. **Plan for dual-use capacity of media.** Infrastructure and institutional assessment supported by the joint forces in theater should incorporate credible civilian expertise on monitoring and regulating media to support stabilization and reconstruction.

**U.S. Government-Funded Media**

**Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) — [http://www.bbg.gov](http://www.bbg.gov)**

In 1999, the Broadcasting Board of Governors became the independent agency responsible for all U.S. government and government-sponsored nonmilitary international broadcasting. PA professionals in contingency operations must be aware of other ways the U.S. government communicates with non-U.S. audiences. The BBG controls the following broadcasting venues:

1. **Voice of America (VOA)** — Radio programming in more than 50 languages. VOA includes Worldnet Television, Internet broadcasting, Latin American radio programming and Eastern Europe radio programming.
2. **Radio Sawa** — Arabic broadcasts throughout Middle East.
4. **Radio Free Asia** — Broadcasting in Eastern Asia in at least nine languages.
5. **Radio/TV Marti** — Broadcasts to Cuba.


DMA is the DoD’s direct line of communication for news and information to U.S. forces worldwide. The agency presents news, information and entertainment on a variety of media platforms. They include radio, television, Internet, print media and emerging media technologies. DMA news and information operations include: Defense.gov, American Forces Network (AFN), American Forces Press Service, The Pentagon Channel, DODLive Blog, Defense Imagery, American Forces Network, Airman magazine, Soldiers magazine, Navy All Hands magazine, Marines magazine, and *Stars & Stripes*.

**Media Operations Center (MOC)**

A **Media Operations Center** (or Joint Information Bureau) is a temporary joint staff organization formed to help a theater commander meet the increased PA demand of a major military operation. A MOC interfaces between the military and news organizations. A MOC is where commanders interact with PA staff members to discuss joint task-force operations such as missions, units or roles. Other titles include:
• **Allied Press Information Center (APIC)** — An APIC is similar to the MOC but includes PAs from allied NATO countries. The APIC is a NATO concept with no internal community-relations responsibilities.

• **Combined Information Bureau (CIB)** — A CIB functions much the same as a JIB but is composed of PA assets from allied or coalition forces. A CIB may be referred to as Combined Press Information Centers (CPIC).

• **Joint Information Centers (JIC)** — A JIC is set up to handle humanitarian operations or disaster relief such as Hurricane Katrina. In the United States, the MOC would be called the JIC when the Federal Emergency Management Agency is involved.

Typical MOC missions will vary according to situation. PA personnel must be flexible to handle activities such as:

• Natural disasters: floods, hurricanes and tornados.
• Major operations: Operation Desert Storm, Operation Noble Eagle, etc.
• Planned events: The National Boy Scout Jamboree, Republican National Convention, presidential funeral, presidential inauguration.

MOCs must be sensitive to the various services’ needs and understand host-nation sensitivity. For that reason, officials from that host nation and the U.S. embassy may try to control MOC operations. Coordination with these officials is essential for successful MOC operations. MOCs work for the joint force commander, NOT the embassy.

**Units supporting the MOC** (active, National Guard or reserve components)

• **Public Affairs Operations Centers (PAOC)** — All PAOCs are in Army reserve components. Four are in the Army National Guard, and four are in the Army Reserve. PAOCs can handle these activities:
  1. Accrediting news media.
  2. Providing briefings.
  3. Escorting journalists.
  4. Operating media pools.
  5. Gathering audio and videotape materials for public releases.
  6. Producing command information newspapers and other products.

• **Mobile Public Affairs Detachments (MPADs)** — MPADs are multifaceted and can be used for any PA function. However, their strength normally lies in internal information. The Army has 44 PADs, 5 of which are active-duty units attached to combat divisions. MPADs are among the most deployed of all Army units.

• **Civil Affairs Units** — PA and civil affairs have similar duties. Both specialties disseminate information to local populations. PA is responsible for dealing with local news outlets and typically will assist civil affairs in disseminating information.

• **Information Operations** — IO representatives should coordinate with the JIB to be sure their operational activities and messages do not conflict with JIB priorities. As part of an overall IO campaign, PA/CA and IO must constantly coordinate and synchronize operations.

• **Combat Camera (COMCAM)** — Combat Camera teams work for J-3 Operations (joint operations). Their mission is combat support and documentation, but they recognize PA as one of their largest customers.
Embargoes

A news embargo is a request by a source that the information provided not be published until a certain date or certain conditions have been met. The understanding is that if the embargo is broken by reporting before then, the source will retaliate by restricting access to further information by that journalist or his/her publication. That restriction will give long-term advantages to more cooperative outlets. In theory, press embargoes reduce inaccuracy in breaking stories by reducing the incentive for journalists to cut corners in hopes of “scooping” the competition.

Embargoes are usually arranged in advance as “gentlemen’s agreements.” However, sometimes publicists will send embargoed news releases to newsrooms unsolicited in hopes that reporters will respect the embargo date without agreeing to do so in advance. Breaking an embargo is typically considered a serious breach of trust and can result in sources barring the offending news outlet from receiving future advance information.

Reporters who accompanied President George W. Bush on a Thanksgiving visit to Iraq in 2003 were embargoed from filing until the president left the country. They were told that, in the interests of security, the trip would be canceled if news broke before its conclusion. Generally, embargoes used in military operations are related to national security issues, and asking media representatives to acknowledge ground rules is always a good idea.

Media Engagement for Counterinsurgency

Many adversaries rely on limiting their population’s knowledge to remain in power. PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces’ messages to different populations.

**Media Relations.** Well-planned, properly coordinated, and clearly expressed themes and messages can significantly clarify confusing situations often associated with countering an insurgency. Clear, accurate portrayals can improve the effectiveness and morale of counterinsurgents, reinforce the will of the U.S. public, and increase popular support for the host-nation government. The right messages can reduce misinformation, distractions, confusion, uncertainty, and other factors that cause public distress and undermine counterinsurgency efforts. Constructive and transparent information enhances understanding and support for continuing operations against the insurgency.

**Embedded Media.** Embedded journalists experience the joint-force perspective of operations in the counterinsurgency environment. Media representatives should be embedded for as long as practicable. Representatives embedded for weeks become better prepared to present informed reports. Short-term media embedding risks reporters not gaining a full understanding of the context of operations. Such short exposure may actually lead to unintended misinformation.

**Press Conferences.** Commanders may have periodic press conferences to explain operations and demonstrate transparency to the people most affected by counterinsurgency efforts. Ideally, these sessions should include the host-nation journalists and host-nation officials. Such events provide opportunities to highlight the accomplishments of the host-nation government and counterinsurgent efforts.
Media Outlets and Communications. Commanders should intentionally establish relationships with media outlets so the military can ensure repeated communication of messages about host-nation government accomplishments and insurgent violence against the population. This relationship building may require commanders to be proactive and alert news organizations to story opportunities and perhaps provide transportation or other services to ensure proper coverage. Helping establish effective host-nation media systems is another important counterinsurgency requirement. However, commanders must strive to avoid the perception of manipulating the population or media. Even the slightest appearance of impropriety can undermine the credibility of the counterinsurgency force and host-nation legitimacy.

Working Relationships. Good working relationships between counterinsurgent leaders and journalists are vital. When they do not understand counterinsurgency efforts, media representatives portray the situation to their audience based on what they know. Such reports can be incomplete or incorrect. Through professional relationships, military leaders should strive to ensure that journalists and their audiences understand the counterinsurgents’ efforts from the counterinsurgents’ perspective.

Social Media and Online Media Outlets. These principles apply to the online/social media environment. It is important to engage in constructive two-way discussion with targeted publics within the guidelines of existing information release and classification standards. It is important to avoid discussion boards or comment sections where conversations quickly devolve into arguments. However, social media can provide a tremendous opportunity to correct false information immediately and provide updated information in real time. (See Internet-Based Capabilities on page 64 of this guide for more information.)
Using Information Technology Efficiently

The APR Study Guide discusses how civilian organizations use the Internet, Worldwide Web and email. This section covers DoD policies relating to the Internet and social networks.

Specific KSAs:

Cyberspace: Understand how the global domain benefits and hinders the information environment.

Social Media/Web 2.0: Demonstrate knowledge of DoD social media and web policies, including operational security concerns.

Internet-Based Capabilities (a.k.a: Web/Social Media)

DODI 8550.01, DoD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities (September 2012) incorporates and cancels Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-026 and provides guidance on Web and Social Media.

Social media is an integral part of DOD operations, requiring that PAOs and staffs assist commanders in making the best use of appropriate platforms. The Internet provides fast and efficient access to a worldwide audience, often without regard to international borders. Our adversaries exploit the Internet through skillful manipulation of social media. PA can counter biased, incomplete, or factually incorrect information with fast, complete, factual, and credible information. Social media is a dynamic, rapidly changing environment, so it is important to learn and adapt as appropriate. Refer to the DOD Social Media Hub for guidance on Web and Internet-based capabilities policies.

The default for the DOD non-classified network is open access so that all of DOD can use the Internet and Internet-based capabilities including social media. Service members and DOD employees are welcome and encouraged to use social media to communicate with family and friends—at home stations or deployed—but they should do so safely. The policy emphasizes one’s responsibility to protect themselves and their information online and that existing regulations on ethics, OPSEC, and privacy still apply. It also encourages all parties to never post any information that could be considered classified, sensitive, or that might put military members or families in danger. All official social media sites within DOD must be registered with the department at the DOD site registry. Registration with one of the Service social media directories satisfies this requirement. All official social media sites within DOD and shared content to include VI must comply with DODI 8550.01 and other regulations (http://www.defense.gov/webmasters/) and must be an approved site.

Decisions to collaborate, participate, or to disseminate or gather information via DoD Internet services or Internet based capabilities shall balance benefits and vulnerabilities.

Information Review

DoD employees shall be educated and trained to conduct both organizational and individual communication effectively to deny adversaries the opportunity to take advantage of information that may be inappropriately disseminated.
DoD and OSD Component Heads and subordinate organizations that disseminate DoD information via unclassified DoD Internet services and internet based capabilities are responsible for instituting an information review process. All information proposed for dissemination must be reviewed internally and be compliant with the provisions described in DODI 8550.01, “DoD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities, prior to clearance approval, release authorization, and subsequent dissemination.

Information not specifically cleared and authorized for public release may be disseminated only via non-public means, such as intranets and private DoD Internet services. Examples of non-public information include information of questionable value to the public; information for which dissemination poses an unacceptable risk to the DoD, including information about employees and family members; and information intended only for DoD employees.

Accessibility

Accessibility. DoD Internet services and DoD information shall be accessible to disabled employees and disabled members of the public, and access shall be comparable to that available to non-disabled individuals in compliance with requirements and alternatives.
Endorsing Non-USG entities

The credibility of DoD information must not be adversely affected by association with non-USG sponsorships, advertisements, or endorsements. Any advertisement by or for any private individual, firm, or corporation shall not be inserted or allowed on public DoD Internet services prepared or produced with either appropriated or non-appropriated funds. DoD endorsement shall not be implied in any manner for any specific non-USG service, facility, event, or product.

Stand-alone non-U.S. government graphics, logos, or aggrandizing statements such as “Powered by …,” “Serviced by …,” and “Designed by …” shall not be inserted or allowed on public DoD Internet services, or the DoD-controlled content area of an internet based capability prepared or produced with either appropriated or non-appropriated funds.

Proprietary rights notices (including copyright and trademark notices) are not aggrandizing statements. Factual acknowledgement of partners, software, technology, and services used on a public DoD Internet service may be included in descriptive information about the service or the organization, such as an “About Us” page; however, such acknowledgement should be carefully considered in the security risk assessment and risk mitigation measures for the service, and may not be used in any manner that supports the appearance of endorsement.

Social Media in Crisis Communication

Using social media to communicate with stakeholders during a crisis has proven to be an especially effective use of the medium due to its speed, reach, and direct access. Social media has facilitated the distribution of information to key audiences and news media while providing a means for dialogue among the affected and interested publics. Here are some things to consider:

1. Leverage already existing social presences to build trust. It is important to have a regularly updated channel of communication open to key audiences before the crisis hits so they know where to find trusted information online.
2. Create a centralized location to funnel information. Do not fragment command into “command emergency services” and “command logistics”. Make the official command page, or a higher echelon page if appropriate, the nexus for information. If there is no command presence, then the people most interested in the crisis may decide to start their own group. Whatever the case, communicate where the people most affected are communicating.
3. Monitor incoming content posted by users on social sites to understand what information they need and what is happening to them. Staff appropriately to answer questions as best as possible and ensure that the audience knows the command is listening and actively involved in the crisis.
4. Post cleared information when available. There is no need to wait for a formal press release.
5. Use mobile devices to keep social presences up to date. Mobile devices allow quick updates.
6. Answer questions as often as practicable. Avoid just posting information on a social media presence; that is what command websites are for. Be prepared to have people ask questions. Respond back as quickly as possible through the most appropriate means of communication.
Internet-based Capabilities in the Tactical Environment

Communication with foreign publics online can contribute to the overall PA mission of the joint force. Specifically, this form of public communication improves:

1. Presence
   a. Communication with foreign publics online helps provide a persistent voice from the joint force and DoD, providing official messages and content.
   b. To maintain an effective presence, the joint force will need to identify and participate in sites that include audiences within the operational area as well as the diaspora. It is likely that the DOS country team is either aware of such sites or is already communicating with them through their own efforts.

2. Communication/Building Reach
   a. Ongoing participation in conversations on relevant sites will build rapport with these publics and further the reach of joint force PA. This active communication presents an opportunity for further dissemination of joint force themes and messages.
   b. This is a continuous process. It is only through steady communication that the opportunities to further the reach with foreign publics will grow.

3. Counter propaganda. Communicating with foreign publics online creates the opportunity to find and refute adversary rhetoric and correct misinformation in public forums with full attribution.

4. Environment Sensing and Cultural Advisement. Monitoring and communicating with relevant foreign publics through online sites also has the benefit of providing information and situational awareness of events, opinions, and trends within the AOR. This contributes to joint force planning broadly and PA planning specifically.

Key considerations for online foreign public communication programs:

1. As PA activities, all activity is fully attributable.
2. Monitoring and communicating is most effectively done with native speakers as they bring a cultural competence and understanding of nuance that is often missing from those trained in a language. This may mean that the joint force will require contractor support to get this quality of expertise.
3. A program to communicate with foreign publics online requires constant supervision by PA staff to ensure the native speakers communicating online are doing so in a manner that appropriately represents the joint force, DoD, and the USG.
4. Themes and messages need to be tailored to the language and culture to be most effective. A simple, literal translation runs the risk of being ineffective if not outright counterproductive.
5. The most effective way to implement an online foreign public communication program is for it to be integrated with a digital communication team that combines public affairs, language, and technical expertise into a single multidisciplinary unit.
6. Joint force and interagency coordination are critical in communicating with foreign publics online. Other parts of the joint force have programs to communicate with foreign publics in different ways, at different levels, using varying levels of attribution (e.g., Information Operations, Key Leader Engagement, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy). In addition, other parts of the U.S. Government (e.g., DOS, USAID) have mandates to work with foreign publics. It is critical that foreign public communication be
fully coordinated within the joint force and also with interagency partners to ensure communication alignment and prevent communication conflicts with foreign publics.

**Alteration of DoD Imagery**

DoD policy prohibits altering DoD imagery in any way that could conceivably weaken or cast doubt on the credibility of that imagery or DoD. Official DoD imagery includes all photographic and video images recorded or produced by people acting for or on behalf of DoD activities, functions or missions — regardless of the medium in which the images are acquired, stored or displayed. Users of DoD imagery will not portray, implicate or otherwise imply endorsement by DoD for any commercial product or service. For more information on use of DoD imagery, go to [http://www.defenseimagery.mil/products/dodimagery.html](http://www.defenseimagery.mil/products/dodimagery.html).

**Example 1**

Image #1 is the camera original. In image #2, helicopters have been electronically added to the original. Altering DoD imagery in this manner is prohibited.
Example 2

Image #1 is the camera original. In image #2, a vehicle has been added to the left of the figure (circled in red), and the oil wells have been removed from the background. Altering DoD imagery in this manner is prohibited. However, adding text and a flag to the camera original to create a poster is not prohibited. These clearly added elements do not have the effect of weakening or casting doubt on the credibility of the image.

Others examples of prohibited imagery alteration can be found at: http://www.defenseimagery.mil/default/learning/vipolicy/dodi/alteredimages.
History of and Current Issues in Public Affairs

The APR Study Guide outlines the development of public relations in the United States during the 20th century and lists notable pioneers. This section continues that discussion. The following pages summarize the history of military PA and structures for joint operations today.

Specific KSAs:

Public Information: Demonstrate knowledge of military information and how public affairs offices are usually the release authority for that information and consistent with operational security (OPSEC). Understand and explain the differences and similarities between public information, public affairs, public relations, and public diplomacy.

Community Relations: Relate the difference between community relations overseas and within the United States.

Current military structure: Demonstrate knowledge of the structure and role of Combatant Commands and supporting unified commands, as well as concepts of supporting and supported commands.

Related career fields: Understand the roles and relationships with Public Affairs (e.g. Information Operations, Civil Affairs, Combat Camera, Visual Information, and Intelligence)

Brief History of PA Career Field

PA developed as a distinct military career field in the United States after World War II. Nevertheless, American military commanders have dealt with PA issues for more than 150 years. War correspondents began covering battlefield operations during the Civil War. Reporters witnessed fighting during the Spanish-American War and World War I as well.

The telegraph, introduced by Samuel Morse in 1844, made daily battlefield reporting possible. Newspaper readers in the 1860s, especially in the North where telegraph networks were well developed, could see accounts of Civil War battles within 24 hours of clashes. Union leaders complained that information wasn’t always accurate. After the U.S.S. Maine blew up February 15, 1898, in Havana Harbor, newspapers published by Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst stoked public support for war. During the 10-week Spanish-American War, declared April 25, 1898, many U.S. dailies carried war news received by telegraph from battles in Cuba, the Philippines and Guam.

In 1907 the Marine Corps established a publicity office in Chicago to support recruiting. The War Department’s Adjutant General Office issued the Army’s first news release that same year. Major Douglas McArthur was named the Army’s press release officer in 1916.

During World War I the federal government worked on several fronts to mobilize public opinion to support sending American troops to Europe. President Woodrow Wilson appointed Denver newspaperman George Creel to head the Committee on Public Information. From April 1917 to August 1919, that agency used newspaper and magazine stories, posters, telegraph messages, and
motion pictures to shape public views of the war and sell war bonds. The committee trained some 75,000 “Four Minute Men.” These volunteers spoke about the war at social events for four minutes. That time was thought to be the average human attention span.

In France in 1917, the American Expeditionary Force formed a press section. The mission was to meet the needs of American war correspondents accompanying U.S. troops into the combat theater. The next year a permanent public relations branch was established within the intelligence staff element.

The Navy Department established the Navy News Bureau during World War I and staffed it with civilian journalists. When German U-boat activity increased, the secretary of the Navy began daily news conferences. After the Armistice, the Navy organized a public relations branch within the Office of Naval Intelligence. The branch remained there until 1941.

In the War Department after World War I, a major was responsible for ground-force public relations. The Army Air Corps, however, set up an Aeronautical Information Branch in 1918. That branch became the Information Division in 1919 and continued operating under that name until 1941.

In 1941 Navy Secretary Frank Knox, former publisher of the Chicago Daily News, moved the Navy’s public affairs responsibility from Naval Intelligence to a new Office of Public Relations. That office, initially directed by Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, reported directly to Knox. Concurrently, the chief of naval operations declared public relations a command responsibility.

In June 1945 the Navy public relations office was renamed the Office of Public Information. In 1950, the Office of Public Information was renamed the Office of Information, the current designation. The head was the chief of information.

In 1941 the War Department named Brigadier General Alexander Surles the first chief of a new Bureau of Public Relations. He led that bureau throughout World War II.

In June 1942 President Franklin Roosevelt expanded the federal government’s public affairs operations. Roosevelt appointed CBS radio newsmen Elmer Davis to head the new Office of War Information. Working separately from the Navy and War departments, that office used press releases, posters, newsreels and radio broadcasts to win public support for the draft, sale of war bonds, commodity rationing, and other wartime hardships. The Office of War Information functioned through August 1945.

During World War II, both the War and Navy departments assigned public relations officers to all major commands. Few officers qualified for public relations duties were in the ranks. Therefore, many journalists and advertising executives were recruited. After the war these reservists left active duty, and the armed services decided they needed permanent public affairs assets.

The War Department established the Army Information School in 1946 at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The school issued the first Handbook for Army Public Relations Officers in September 1946.

When the Department of Defense was formed in 1947, it had a token public affairs staff. In 1949 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal established an Office of Public Information. While the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps maintained service-level public affairs operations, the
A new office became the sole source of department-level military news. In 1961 the director of the Office of Public Information was re-designated assistant secretary of defense (public affairs).

The new DoD designation introduced the use of “public affairs” to describe military public relations. The individual services began shifting terminology from public relations to “information” or “public information” during the 1950s and then to “public affairs” in the early 1970s. The Air Force in 1975 was the last service to make the change from “Information Officer” to “Public Affairs Officer.” By the mid-1970s, enlisted personnel in all services but the Navy were known as “public affairs specialists.” The Navy changed the enlisted designations “journalist” and “photographer” to “mass communication specialist” in 2006.

The Army Information School continued operating through 1947, with the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps sending small numbers of students to the school for training. During 1946 and 1947, the Air Force operated a separate Public Information School at Craig Air Force Base, Alabama.

In 1948 the Army school was renamed the Armed Forces Information School and operated as a joint-service training facility. It incorporated the Air Force Public Information School. The Navy opened the Naval Journalist School at Great Lakes, Illinois, in June 1948. In 1951 the Armed Forces Information School moved from Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to Fort Slocum, New York, and was reestablished as the Army Information School.

In 1961 Arthur Sylvester, assistant secretary of defense (public affairs), determined that public affairs training was common to all services and that combining individual service schools into a joint-service operation would be economical and efficient. DoD chartered the Defense Information School in February 1964. The school merged the Naval Journalist School with the Army Information School in September 1965 at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.


In February 2009 Robert T. Hastings, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, signed a memorandum of understand with the Universal Accreditation Board for public relations practitioners. That memo governed creation of “a professional development and Accreditation program geared toward personnel responsible for public affairs within the Department of Defense.” DoD became a participating organization in the industrywide Accreditation process. Under terms of the memo, the Universal Accreditation Board developed the APR+M credential. People who earn the credential are Accredited in Public Relations. The “+M” indicates those practitioners have mastered additional knowledge, skills and abilities unique to military PA. The credential is available to active and reserve service members, DoD civilians, and defense contractors who work in communication fields.

Today the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have organic officer, enlisted and civilian public affairs assets at all levels of command.
Military PA Today

Today military PA practitioners commonly provide support to a range of joint missions and taskings. In many cases those missions are in support of, or in conjunction with, other military forces, federal government agencies, first responders and community organizations. And in many of those scenarios, military PA professionals must carefully balance operational security with the public’s right to information. While reporters are interested in the essential facts of any situation, that information is incomplete without an understanding of the background, underlying rationale and other fundamental elements of the myriad missions in which military PA practitioners play a part. Among them:

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA missions, conducted outside the United States, its territories and possessions, involve a delicate balance of political and military objectives.

Counterdrug (CD) Operations. Legal and law-enforcement aspects of CD are extremely sensitive and generate additional concerns in the release of information to the public.

Combating Terrorism. Terrorist threats and acts occur in media-intense environments. Preventing coverage that could reveal tactics, techniques and procedures used in combating terrorism may be impossible.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). NEOs assist the State Department in evacuating noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host-nation citizens, and third-country nationals whose lives are in danger to a safe haven.

Peace Operations. Peace Operations encompass peacekeeping (PKO) and peace enforcement (PEO) conducted to support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and Civil Affairs (CA). CMO establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral or hostile operational area.

Domestic Operations. The U.S. military and hundreds of PA professionals at all levels have assisted other federal government agencies during disaster-response operations within the United States

Additional Duties as Assigned

Today’s military PA practitioner may, in many cases, also be called upon to perform, or at least collaborate with, specialties that are similar to PA but have specific and disparate functions. Those may include:

Visual Information (VI). VI is an essential resource for strategic communication. Products PA personnel may gather as part of this additional duty include digital still images, analog and digital video recordings, and hand- or computer-generated graphic art and animations.

Information Operations (IO). In overseas locations, PA integrates with IO practitioners whose mission it may be to influence or disrupt our adversaries. While PA remains tied to DoD’s Principles of Information, it is important to understand where PA and IO lines blur and complement each other.
Civil Affairs. In some cases, military PA professionals may assist with relationship building and interagency coordination that could fall under the civil affairs umbrella – especially if operating in a location where military operations are ongoing.

Intelligence. Monitoring traditional and digital media, including social networking sites, can provide essential information for intelligence personnel as they work to assess the operational environment. In many smaller military organizations the J2 (intelligence) and PAO work hand-in-hand to provide timely and accurate date to command.

Combat Camera. Combat Camera teams are trained to provide still and motion imagery of various military activities. As a requested asset, there are times where trained Combat Camera personnel may not be readily available to provide essential coverage. PA personnel may need to fill that niche in local disaster situations, emergencies and training operations.

Expansionary Public Affairs

Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) — One of three subordinate commands of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), JPASE is DoD’s only joint PA unit that can deploy within hours to assist in crisis or contingency operations. Since its establishment in 2005, JPASE has provided ready, rapidly deployable PA capability to combatant commanders to facilitate the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, bridge PA requirements and conduct PA training to meet evolving theater information challenges.

Navy Public Affairs Support Element (NPASE) — Formerly known as Fleet Public Affairs Centers, NPASE has offices in Norfolk, Va., and San Diego, Calif. They are field activities of the Navy Office of Information. NPASE teams are made up of PA officers and enlisted personnel. They provide expeditionary PA forces to support fleet and component commanders with scalable and immediate deployable force packages trained and equipped to support current and emerging PA requirements.

Unified Command Plan

The Unified Command Plan establishes the mission, provides guidance to all combatant commanders and outlines the general geographic area of responsibility for the combatant commands. A unified combatant command is composed of forces from two or more services and is organized by geographical regions or functional mission. Six combatant commands are geographic, and three are functional.

Geographic Combatant Commands

U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) was established Aug. 1, 1952, to provide “unified command and authority” over all U.S. forces in Europe. For several years after World War II, the services had maintained separate commands in Europe. These commands reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. U.S. European Command combined these service-level organizations. EUCOM conducts military operations, international military partnering, and interagency partnering to enhance trans-Atlantic security and defend the United States forward. EUCOM carries out its mission by establishing an agile security organization able to conduct full-spectrum activities as part of the whole of government solutions to secure enduring stability in Europe and Eurasia.

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was established Jan. 1, 1983. USCENTCOM covers the “central” area of the globe between the European and Pacific Commands. When the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan underlined the need to strengthen U.S. interests in the region, President Jimmy Carter established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in March 1980. To provide a stronger, more lasting solution in the region, President Ronald Reagan transformed the RDJTF into a permanent unified command. With national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction to establish conditions for regional security, stability and prosperity.
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established Oct. 1, 2002, to provide command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM anticipates and conducts homeland defense and civil support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), established in 1947, is the oldest and largest of the U.S. unified commands. With allies and partners, PACOM enhances stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression and providing military force.

U.S. Southern Command (USOUTHCOM) is a descendant of military units dispatched to Panama in the early 20th century. SOUTHCOM’s history as a unified military headquarters began during World War II with the U.S. Caribbean Defense Command. During the 1950s, the responsibility shifted from U.S. military missions in the Caribbean basin to operations primarily in Central and South America. The command got its current name in 1963. Forces assigned to SOUTHCOM support U.S. and allied nations’ law enforcement agencies for counter-drug operations, joint and bilateral/multilateral exercises, engineering and medical exercises, search-and-rescue operations, disaster-relief operations, humanitarian and civic-assistance operations, command-post exercises, security-assistance programs, personnel-exchange programs, staff visits, conferences and other foreign military interaction (military-to-military contact) programs.

Functional Combatant Commands


U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was initially established on June 1, 1992. In 2002, U.S. Space Command merged with STRATCOM. It controls military space operations, computer-network operations, information operations, strategic warning and intelligence assessments, and global strategic planning. The command’s mission is to deter military attack on the United States and its allies. Should deterrence fail, the mission is to employ forces to achieve national objectives. The command is responsible for both early warning of and defense against missile attack and long-range conventional attacks. The command is charged with deterring and defending against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) On August 18, 2017, DoD initiated the process to elevate USCYBERCOM from sub-unified command status to a unified combatant command. USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified DoD information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was established in 1987. As the single manager of America’s global defense transportation system, USTRANSCOM coordinates people and transportation assets to allow our country to project and sustain forces whenever, wherever, and for as long as they are needed. Responding to the needs of DoD war-fighting commanders is USTRANSCOM’s No. 1 priority. TRANSCOM is composed of three component commands: The Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, and the Army’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. USTRANSCOM coordinates missions worldwide using both military and commercial transportation resources.
Advanced Communication Skills

The APR Study Guide discusses three advanced communication skills: consensus building, consulting and negotiating. This section continues that discussion by considering communication synchronization and other advanced concepts in joint public affairs operations.

Specific KSAs:

**Communication Synchronization:** Understand the principles and process of strategic communication

**National Military Strategy:** understand the purpose of the national military strategy and how it relates to Public Affairs.

**DIME/PMESII:** Understand how the National Elements of Power: Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) and how Political, Military, Economic, Social Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) help shape U.S. policy and planning.

**National Response Framework:** Demonstrate knowledge of the National Response framework defines the principles, roles, and structures that organize how we respond as a nation.

**Interagency coordination:** Understand the interagency process and how military public affairs operations are impacted by the interagency, as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), independent government organizations (IGOs), host nation organizations, and other.

**Joint Intelligence preparation of the operational environment:** Understand the importance of public affairs collaboration with other information-related activities.

Information is an important instrument of national power and a strategic resource critical to national security. This concept extends to non-state actors—such as terrorists and transnational criminal groups. They use information to further their causes and undermine those of the U.S. government and our allies.

DoD operates in a dynamic age of interconnected global networks and evolving social media platforms. Today’ operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect commanders’ decisions. Understanding this environment requires a holistic view. This view extends beyond the adversary’s military forces and other combat capabilities within the operational area. A holistic view of the operational environment encompasses physical domains; the information environment; adversarial, friendly and neutral PMESII systems; and any other factors relevant to a specific joint operation. Every DoD action that is planned or executed, word that is written or spoken, and image that is displayed or relayed, communicates the intent of DoD, and by extension the federal government. All these communications have potential for strategic effects.
Communication Synchronization — A Coordination Process

DoD makes every effort to synchronize, align and coordinate communication activities. This synchronization facilitates understanding of how planning and execution of DoD strategies, plans, operations and activities will be understood by key audiences. This coordination is undertaken to improve the efficacy of actions and create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advancing defense and military objectives.

Communication synchronization entails focused efforts to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for advancement of national interests. Beliefs, perceptions and behavior of key audiences are crucial to the success of any strategy, plan or operation. Communication synchronization requires understanding and engaging key audiences through coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages and products matched with military actions. When planning and executing operations, commanders and staffs at all levels should identify and understand key audience perceptions and possible reactions. This understanding is vital. Real or perceived differences between actions and words (the “say-do” gap) could reduce DoD credibility and negatively affect current and future missions. An effective combination of themes, messages, images and actions, consistent with higher-level guidance, is essential to effective DoD operations.

Commander’s communication guidance is a fundamental component of joint operation planning. Joint force commanders implement higher-level communication guidance through the commander’s communication synchronization (CSS) process. CSS makes PA, IO and DSPD supporting capabilities. Leaders, planners, and operators at all levels need to understand the desired effects and potential undesired effects of actions. Joint force staffs develop approaches for achieving information-related objectives and ensuring the integrity and consistency of themes, messages, images and actions to the lowest level.

Principles behind synchronization:

- Leadership-driven — Leaders must engage and lead the communication process.
- Credible — Perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties.
- Understanding — Deep comprehension of attitudes, cultures, identities, behavior, history, perspectives and social systems.
- Dialogue — Multifaceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships.
- Pervasive — Every action, image and word sends a message.
- Unity of Effort — Integrated and coordinated, vertically and horizontally.
- Results-based — Actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated end state.
- Responsive — Right audience, right message, right time and right place.
- Continuous — Diligent ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment that feeds planning and action.

The synchronization process is designed to maximize effects of efforts to:

- Improve U.S. credibility and legitimacy.
- Weaken an adversary’s credibility and legitimacy.
- Convince selected audiences that they should take specific actions.
- Cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) specific actions.
National Military Strategy

The National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy, and Defense Strategy Review lay the foundation of every U.S. military mission. You must be familiar with these documents to maintain credibility with your service, journalists, and the public. You should understand what the National Military Strategy supports. Military strategy is subordinate to the National Security Strategy. Consequently, the military may support other U.S. agencies rather than having the lead role. Military force is only one option available to our leadership. (See also Guiding Documents, pg. 39 of this guide.)

Threats to National Security

Regional and Space Threats. Several nations can threaten U.S. vital interests by using regional power and space capabilities to menace the flow of critical information and communications.

Transnational Threats. These non-state groups can use terrorism to threaten vital U.S. interests.

Weapons of Mass Destruction. These weapons can cause high-order destruction when used by rogue states or non-state terrorist groups against U.S. interests. These weapons may include nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical agents.

Spread of Dangerous Technologies. The global diffusion of knowledge of how to employ dangerous technologies empowers adversaries to exploit technological power to their advantage.

Failed States. Failed states may become powerless to prevent internal conflict, massive killing, vast migrations, environmental disasters or the loss of control of their armed forces. Uncontrolled violence in failed states can threaten the security of the United States and its allies.

Foreign Intelligence Collection. Invasive intelligence-gathering capability threatens to compromise U.S. ability to prevent penetration of key governmental and private organizations.

Asymmetric Threats. Adversaries may use multiple forms of power to target U.S. vulnerabilities. The goal is to achieve asymmetric advantage or a negative impact. Adversaries may use unconventional weapons (like commercial airliners on 9/11) to exploit weaknesses in U.S. defense systems rather than confronting U.S. military forces directly.

National Power

The United States implements foreign policy in a variety of ways and across a full range of policy options. The U.S. has four primary instruments of national power:

Diplomatic. Diplomacy is designed to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives peacefully. The first line of diplomacy is communication. Our government “engages” friends and foes to prevent or deter conflict. Armed forces support diplomacy in many ways. Military operations, such as a show of force or a joint military exercise, can back up diplomatic programs. Military-to-military contact programs and national assistance efforts may have diplomatic objectives.

Information. The government routinely promotes vital U.S. interests through information dissemination. Information use may take several forms. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Martin and sometimes Voice of America have had psychological effects on listeners.
Psychological operations try to influence potential enemies and prevent or reduce U.S. casualties.

**Military.** Military power is used to preserve or defend U.S. national interests. When other foreign policy tools fail, the threat of armed conflict remains the backbone of deterrence. Knowing that our armed forces are ready to respond to situations can prevent war. Military force is usually the choice of last resort to achieve a national goal.

**Economic.** Control of commercial and trade relationships can promote fundamental U.S. objectives. The United States provides billions of dollars in financial assistance, either directly or in the form of trade, to other nations. The offer of aid, or the threat to withhold it, has great influence over actions by foreign governments. Forward-deployed naval forces usually enforce embargoes, which are at the high end of the economic sanctions scale.

**Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII)**

The PMESII construct ensures that warfighters address all elements of an adversary’s national power. Together with an understanding of our elements of national power, PMESII provides a strong foundation for joint planning.
National Response Framework

The National Response Framework (NRF) is part of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and is one of five documents in the National Planning Frameworks. Each covers one preparedness mission area: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery.

The second edition of the NRF, updated in May 2013, provides context for how the whole community works together and how response efforts relate to other parts of national preparedness. The NRF recognizes families, individuals and households as key components of the whole community. The NRF presents guiding principles for all levels of domestic-response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. The NRF is built on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) standardization. The NRF’s coordinating structures are always in effect for implementation at any level and at any time for local, state, and national emergency or disaster response.

Five NRF guiding principles

1. **Engaged partnership**: Effective partnership relies on engaging all elements of the whole community, as well as international partners in some cases. This also includes survivors who may require assistance and who may also be resources to support community response and recovery. Those who lead emergency response efforts must communicate and support engagement with the whole community by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities to reduce the risk of any jurisdiction being overwhelmed in times of crisis. Layered, mutually supporting capabilities of individuals, communities, the private sector, NGOs, and governments at all levels allow for coordinated planning in times of calm and effective response in times of crisis. Engaged partnership and coalition building includes ongoing clear, consistent, accessible, effective, and culturally and linguistically appropriate communication and shared situational awareness about an incident to ensure an appropriate response.

2. **Tiered response**: Most incidents begin and end locally and are managed at the local or tribal level. These incidents may require a unified response from local agencies, the private sector, and NGOs. Some may require additional support from neighboring jurisdictions or state governments. A smaller number of incidents require Federal support or are led by the Federal Government. National response protocols are structured to provide tiered levels of support when additional resources or capabilities are needed.

3. **Scalable, flexible and adaptable operational capabilities**: As incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, response efforts must adapt to meet evolving requirements. The number, type, and sources of resources must be able to expand rapidly to meet the changing needs associated with a given incident and its cascading effects. As needs grow and change, response processes must remain nimble and adaptable. The structures and processes described in the NRF must be able to surge resources from the whole community. As incidents stabilize, response efforts must be flexible to facilitate the integration of recovery activities.

4. **Unity of effort through unified command**: Effective, unified command is indispensable to response activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all participating organizations. The Incident Command System (ICS), a component of NIMS, is an important element in ensuring interoperability across multi-jurisdictional or multiagency incident management activities. Unified command, a central tenet of ICS,
enables organizations with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for an incident to support each other through the use of mutually developed incident objectives. Each participating agency maintains its own authority, responsibility, and accountability.

5. **Readiness to act**: Effective response requires a readiness to act that is balanced with an understanding of the risks and hazards responders face. From individuals and communities to the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and all levels of government (local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal), national response depends on the ability to act decisively. A forward-leaning posture is imperative for incidents that may expand rapidly in size, scope, or complexity, as well as incidents that occur without warning. Decisive action is often required to save lives and protect property and the environment. Although some risk to responders may be unavoidable, all response personnel are responsible for anticipating and managing risk through proper planning, organizing, equipping, training, and exercising.

### Interagency (and NGO) Coordination

Interagency coordination requires day-to-day interaction. Agencies must have mechanisms for resolving disputes. Strategic planning for crisis response among military and civilian agencies is disconnected because of:

- Structural differences among agencies.
- Competing bureaucratic interests.
- Differences in what “planning” is all about.
- Varied information-sharing practices.
- Time pressures.
- Lack of understanding of planning by other agencies.

When working in an interagency environment, you must:

- Assess all aspects of the situation.
- Listen to all key players and know their objectives.
- Gain multilateral consensus on strategic purpose.
- Consult with coalition partners to strengthen planning.
- Formulate strategy integrating diplomatic, military, humanitarian, police and other efforts. Avoid sharp civil-military lines.
- Track underlying assumptions of the president’s policy decision, and over time evaluate the overall approach to achieve the desired end state as the operation unfolds.
- Establish mechanisms for integration at all levels.
- Be flexible and adjust as necessary.

Major disaster-relief operations are sophisticated exercises in international cooperation. These operations require enormous managerial skill across diverse disciplines to link military units, humanitarian agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private-sector contributors. Integrating the multitude of actors now involved in humanitarian-assistance/disaster-response operations will require significant improvements in joint, combined and inter-departmental planning to achieve unity.

**Information Activities Planning.** Some activities are nested within the interagency strategic communication. Information planners must coordinate information activities to accomplish
counterinsurgency objectives. Planners should develop common, multiechelon themes based on and consistent with host-nation government policies and the operation’s objectives.

**Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)**

The operational environment (OE) is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process is used to analyze all relevant aspects of this environment, including the adversary and other actors; the physical domains (air, land, maritime, and space); the information environment (which includes cyberspace); and political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems and subsystems.

A holistic understanding of all relevant components within the OE helps the joint force commander (JFC) to know how the OE constrains or shapes options, how the OE affects capabilities, and how friendly, adversary, and neutral actors’ actions affect or shape the conflict. Of greatest significance, understanding relevant aspects of the OE enables the JFC to leverage aspects of the OE to achieve the objectives and attain the desired end states of the operation.

The JIPOE process provides a disciplined methodology for applying a holistic view of the OE to the analysis of adversary capabilities and intentions. This process consists of four basic steps:

1. Define the operational environment (OE).
2. Describe the impact of the OE.
3. Evaluate the adversary and other relevant actors.
4. Determine the course of action (COA) for adversary and other relevant actors, particularly the most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment

These four steps ensure the systematic analysis of all relevant aspects of the OE. The process is both continuous and cyclical in that JIPOE is conducted both prior to and during a joint operation as well as during planning for follow-on missions. The most current information available regarding the adversary situation and the OE is continuously integrated throughout the JIPOE process. Although some aspects of the JIPOE process may require adjustment depending on the type of mission, the basic process remains the same throughout the range of military operations.

Public affairs should have a representative in the JIPOE coordination cell and may be requested to provide a PA or media assessment as part of the process.
Counterinsurgency / Adversarial Media

Counterinsurgency doctrine reminds us that effective insurgents adapt rapidly. They cleverly manipulate the information environment for strategic effects to magnify and distort their tactical actions. PA professionals should understand their role in counterinsurgency operations by countering extremist propaganda, which influences local populations.

Suni insurgents in Iraq and their supporters worldwide were exploiting the Internet to carry out a far-reaching media campaign. Insurgent media were shaping perceptions of the Iraq war among the best-educated and most influential segment of the Arab population. In 2007, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty presented an overview of major periodicals and audiovisual products issued by Iraqi insurgent groups and sympathizers. These products trumpeted insurgents’ achievements and advance their goals.

- Captions in some videos, such as an Ansar al-Sunnah recording of an IED attack on a U.S. truck, were modeled on captions accompanying news footage on cable news channels like CNN and Al-Jazeera. A side-by-side comparison of an April 12 news release from the U.S. military and a “news report” issued by ISI/al-Qaida and posted to World News Network illustrates the extent to which insurgents attempt to reproduce the form of official press releases while adjusting content to serve their purposes.

Other observations from the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report:
- The Iraqi insurgent media network is a boon to global jihadist media, which can use materials produced by the insurgency to reinforce the jihadist message.
- Mainstream Arab media amplify insurgents’ efforts by transmitting their message to an audience of millions.
- The insurgent propaganda network does not have a headquarters, bureaucracy or brick-and-mortar infrastructure. The network is decentralized, fast moving and technologically adaptive.
• Growing Sunni-Shiite hate speech in Iraqi insurgent media points to the danger of even greater sectarian bloodshed. Evidence shows that hate speech paved the way for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

• The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media reflects a genuine demand in the Arab world for the insurgent message. An alternative, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand.

• The U.S. offers little to counter this torrent of daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films and television programs from insurgents.

• We should not concede the battle without a fight. The insurgent media network has key vulnerabilities that can be targeted. These include a lack of central coordination, a resulting lack of message control and a widening rift between homegrown nationalist groups and al-Qaida-affiliated global jihadists.
Glossary of Terms

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system — A Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. (JP 5-0)

Adversarial media — The social, political and economic environment of the conflict shapes the potential role of the media. Many adversaries are adept at manipulating information about U.S. activities and spreading it via the Internet or conventional media. Information in the public domain can be a powerful tool for manipulating perceptions, inducing fear, increasing polarization and separation between groups, and ultimately, mobilizing populations to action and violence, which can undermine reconstruction and stabilization operations. (“Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media,” Unified Action Handbook Series Book Three)

Annex F — Public affairs planning annex to an operations order. (JP 5-0)
Annex Y — Strategic communication annex to an operations order. (JP 5-0)

Appendix 9 to an Operations Order (Annex C) — Combat camera (COMCAM) annex to an operations order.

Article 5 Operations, NATO — The principle of “Collective Defence” remains a unique and enduring principle that binds NATO members. If a NATO nation is attacked, every other alliance member will consider this act of violence an armed attack against all members. Each NATO member will respond as it deems necessary to assist the ally attacked. NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. ([http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-05DFBDA5-8B11FC93/natolive/topics_59378.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-05DFBDA5-8B11FC93/natolive/topics_59378.htm))

Article 19, United Nations Charter — Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Campaign Planning — The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. (JP 5-0)

Civil Affairs (CA) — Designated active and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)

Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) — Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)
**Combat Camera** — Combat Camera teams acquire still and motion imagery in support of combat, information, humanitarian, Special Forces, intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, PA and other operations involving the military service. See visual information. (JP 3-61)

**Communication Integration** — Alignment of intra- and interorganizational communicators/messages and integration/involvement of communicators throughout all major business processes. (SAF/PA, January 2009)

**Community Relations** — PA programs that address issues of interest to the general public, business, academia, veterans, service organizations, military, related associations and other non-news media entities. Programs are usually associated with the interaction between U.S. military installations and their nearby civilian communities. Civil-military operations with PA support handle interactions with non-news media civilians in an operational area overseas. (JP 3-61)

**Counterinsurgency (COIN)** — Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP 3-24)

**Crisis Action Planning (CAP)** — The Adaptive Planning and Execution system process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. (JP 5-0)

**Cultural Implications** — Misunderstanding culture at a strategic level can produce policies that exacerbate an insurgency; a lack of cultural knowledge at an operational level can lead to negative public opinion; and ignorance of the culture at a tactical level can endanger both civilians and troops. Lack of adversary cultural knowledge can have grave consequences strategically, operationally and tactically. (Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 38)

**Cyberspace** — A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP 3-12)

**Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)** — Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support. (JP 3-28)

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD)** — DoD activities to support and facilitate U.S. public diplomacy efforts. (JP 3-13)

**DIME** — Four elements of national power: diplomatic, economic, information and military. (JP 1)

**Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)** — A team of specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, rapidly deployed to assist US embassies and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. (JP 3-08)
Free Press — Communication organizations that operate without prior government restraint. Joint force commanders need to encourage independent news reporting that offers objective information that host-nation populations understand and accept. Commanders need to ensure that journalists are not coerced or co-opted by elements opposed to the re-establishment of a legitimate and responsible government. PA operations overseas may encounter situations in which some communication organizations directly or indirectly controlled by the government co-exist with purely “private” organizations. Private newspapers or radio/TV stations may mix political and informational programming. (“Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media,” Unified Action Handbook Series Book Two)

Host Nation Support — Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 4-0)

Humanitarian Assistance — Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 3-57)

Information Operations (IO) — The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

Instruments of National Power — All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME). (JP 1)

Interagency Coordination — Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) — The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision-making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary; and determining adversary courses of action. (JP 2-01.3)

Joint Operations Planning — Planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. (JP 5-0)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) — An Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system technology. (JP 5-0)

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) — A multiservice approach to Professional Military Education (PME). Joint Professional Military Education was established after World War II to foster more effective cooperation between the branches of the armed forces. The 1983
Beirut barracks bombing emphasized the continuing need for cooperative training. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, meant to overcome barriers to intraservice cooperation, popularized JPME. The act mandated JPME standards and made JPME a requirement for becoming a joint staff officer. (Wikipedia)

**Law of Armed Conflict** — International law that regulates conduct of armed hostilities. See also, rules of engagement.

**Lead Federal Agency (LFA)** — The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. (JP 3-41)

**Line of Effort (LOE)** — In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. (JP 5-0)

**Line of Operations (LOO)** — (1) A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or (2) a line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective or objectives. (JP 5-0)

**Media Assessment** — At an installation or within a command, media assessment judges the accuracy of news reports and determines perception of local, national and international coverage. In a conflict or post-conflict environment, media assessment relates to establishing independent communication organizations. That work is not a primary military responsibility. Nevertheless, military support may include personnel with a good working knowledge of the news industry and technical or engineering skills. Personnel from the joint force who may be involved in rebuilding or establishing news outlets include PA, IO (principally PSYOP) and CA. (“Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and Media,” Unified Action Handbook Series Book Three)

**Media Operations Center (MOC).** A facility established by the commander to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of military operations.

**Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)** — See Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

**National Military Strategy** — An annual report describing the strategic environment and the opportunities and challenges that affect U.S. national interests security. The report must describe the most significant regional threats to U.S. national interests and security as well as the international threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and asymmetric challenges. (Wikipedia)

**National Response Framework** — The National Response Framework: (1) describes how communities, tribes, states, the federal government, private sectors and nongovernmental partners work together to coordinate national response; (2) describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents; and (3) builds upon the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. (http://www.dhs.gov)

**Noncombatants Evacuation Operations** — Operations directed by the State Department or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the DoD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries to safe havens or to the United States. Lives of these noncombatants are endangered by war, civil unrest or natural disaster.
Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) — A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) — Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. (JP 2-0)

PMESII — Political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure. (JP 1-02)

Posse Comitatus Act — Prohibits giving search, seizure, or arrest powers to U.S. military personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased DoD support of drug-interdiction and other law-enforcement activities. (18 USC Section 1385)

Public Affairs Assessment — An analysis of the news coverage and public environments to evaluate understanding about military activities and to identify public support. The assessment includes judgments about effects of pending command decisions on public perceptions and recommendations about the PA support structure for assigned missions. (JP 3-61)

Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) — Constraints and restraints established by proper authority regarding public information, command information, and community relations activities. It may also address the method(s), timing, location, and other details governing the release of information to the public. (JP 3-61)

Public Diplomacy — (1) Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (2) In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. (JP 3-07.3)

Public information — Within public affairs, that information of a military nature, the dissemination of which is consistent with security and approved for release. (JP 3-61)

Range of Military Operations — The military instrument of national power may be used by our nation’s leaders in a wide variety of activities, tasks, missions and operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk and combat intensity. These operations are grouped in three areas that compose the range of military operations: (1) military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence, (2) crisis response and limited contingency operations, and (3) major operations and campaigns. (JP 3-0)

Resource, Planning, Program, Budget, Execution Process — The PPBE process is how DoD allocates resources and stays within budget while following the secretary of defense’s policy, strategy and goals.

Risk Management — The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 3-0)

Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) — Directives issued to guide United States forces on the use of force during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. (JP 3-28)
**Rules of Engagement (ROE)** — Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04)

**Stability Operations** — An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

**Strategic Level of War** — The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (JP 3-0)

**Visual Information (VI)** — Information in the form of visual or pictorial representations of person(s), place(s), or thing(s), with or without sound. VI includes still photographs, digital still images, motion pictures, analog and digital video recordings, and hand- or computer-generated graphic art and animations that depict real or imaginary person(s), place(s), and/or thing(s), and related captions, overlays and intellectual control data.